



Improving Recovery Governance from Mega-Disasters

Initial Observations from ADRC Collaborative Research Project

**Asian Conference on Disaster Reduction
Ankara, Turkey
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Decades of Development

('bureaucratic' processes)



February 22, 2012
Source: DigitalGlobe

An aerial photograph showing a dense, informal settlement built on a riverbank. The buildings are tightly packed and appear to be made of various materials, including brick and corrugated metal. A river flows through the settlement, with several boats, including a large cargo ship, visible. The overall scene suggests rapid, unplanned urban development.

**Development to be Compressed
in Short Period of Time**
(‘flexible’ processes)

November 10, 2013
Source: DigitalGlobe

Problem #1 Institutional Limitations

**Existing DRM System
is Inadequate!**

Is Creating New Agency the Answer?

Past experiences of recovery governance from Mega-disaster

- **GSDMA** in Gujarat (2001 Earthquake)
- **BRR** in Aceh (2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami)
- **ERRA** in Pakistan (2005 Kashmir Earthquake)
- **QRA** in Queensland (2010-2011 Flooding)
- **CERA** in New Zealand (2011 Earthquake)
- **Reconstruction Agency** in Japan (2011 Great East Japan Earthquake)
- **OPARR** in the Philippines (2013 Super Typhoon Haiyan)
- **NRA** in Nepal (Gorkha Earthquake 2015)

WHY new agency?

- **Absence of DRM institution (or dysfunctions due to disaster impact)**
- **Social, political, and cultural factors**

Problem #2: No 'pre-agreed' short-cuts

Barriers to Recovery Governance

1. POWER to lead recovery is unclear

Interagency 'turfs' and mandates

(e.g., government line agencies)

Multiple recovery actors

- Donors
- International agencies
- NGOs / NPOs
- Private Sector
- Volunteer Groups

“Absolute Power”

or

“Coordinative Power”



2. RULES are inappropriate for recovery

Permits

(e.g., police, immigration, taxation, customs, forestry, and registration of new entity)

Procurement

(e.g., tender process, impact assessments, and bidding)

Fund transfer/access mechanisms

(e.g., DRM fund, national share, certificates, and application window)

“Bureaucratic Process” or “Flexible Process”



3. Absence of clear ACCOUNTABILITY system

Basic Information Unavailable

- How much resources is **actually** available? (e.g., FAITH and EMPATHY)

Incomplete Projects

- Are recovery resources translated into completed projects? Did it benefit the community? (e.g., 'white elephant' project)

Inability to persecute violators

- Are those implementing the recovery program credible?

“Anti-Corruption Unit” and “Audits and Review”



Insights on Improving Disaster Recovery Governance

PERMANENT Recovery Institution?

To address issues concerning:

- Setting up
- Bureaucratic 'turfs'
- Administrative processes
- Political dynamics

Suggested Powers & Functions

- Distribute and monitor additional funds
- Implement preventive and mitigation measures to reduce long-term losses
- Enhance capacities of implementers in the event of mega-disasters



Institutionalization of FLEXIBLE Processes?


To address issues concerning:

- Long approval process (e.g., permits)
- Lengthy requirements (e.g., certifications)
- Poor utilization of recovery funds

Flexible Processes (during recovery)

(i.e., shorter procedures, lesser requirements, faster approval, and timely transfer and utilization of funds to implement recovery programs)

- Simplified DRM fund access (e.g., Indonesia & PH)
- Fast-tracked *Environmental Impact Assessment*
- Timely transfer and utilization of recovery fund




OPEN Recovery Database?

To address issues concerning:

- Transparency
- Coordination
- Harmonization

Linking recovery database with

- Post Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA)
- Disaster Loss Database
- All other DRM Databases



Thank You!