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Tracking system and management of donated goods in Japan

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Table of contents
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT........................................................................................................ 3
ABBREVIATION................................................................................................................ 4
1. BACKGROUND.................................................................................................................. 5
2. THE GREAT EAST JAPAN EARTHQUAKE................................................................. 6
3. (GEJE) ............................................................................................................................. 8
   DISASTER MANAGEMENT SYSTEM OF JAPAN......................................................... 8
4. 3.1 LEGAL BASIS............................................................................................................ 15
   3.2 OVERVIEW OF THE DISASTER MANAGEMENT SYSTEM..................................... 15
5. DISASTER EMERGENCY RESPONSE MANAGEMENT................................................. 19
6. 4.1 OUTLINE OF DISASTER RESPONSE................................................................. 24
   4.2 CABINET OFFICE DISASTER RESPONSE MECHANISM.................................... 24
   NATIONAL RESPONSE IN THE GREAT EAST JAPAN EARTHQUAKE (GEJE) .......... 38
   COORDINATION DISASTER RELIEF DURING THE GEJE.........................................
7. 6.1 GOVERNMENT......................................................................................................... 43
8. 6.2 NON GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION............................................................... 48
9. (NGOs), INTERNATIONAL................................................................. 53
10. NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION COORDINATION (INGO), .................... 57
11. VOLUNTEE. ................................................................................................................ 62
   RECEIVING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN DOMESTIC...... 62
   DISASTER RELIEF MATERIAL MANAGEMENT IN THE GEJE................................. 63
   PROBLEM AND CAUSES OF RELIEF MATERIAL MANAGEMENT IN THE GEJE 82
   CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................. 82
APPENDIX.........................................................................................................................
   - THAILAND FLOODS 2011.........................................................................................
   - COMPARISON BETWEEN IN THE GEJE AND THAILAND FLOOD 2011....
BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................................................................................................
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## ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DDPM</td>
<td>Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, Ministry of Interior, Thailand</td>
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<td>FROC</td>
<td>Flood Relief Operations Command</td>
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<td>GEJE</td>
<td>The Great East JAPAN Earthquake</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCBA</td>
<td>Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>JRCS</td>
<td>The Japanese Red Cross Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan</td>
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<td>MOJ</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice, Japan</td>
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<td>FDMA</td>
<td>Fire and Disaster Management Agency</td>
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<td>CAO</td>
<td>Cabinet Office</td>
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<td>MLIT</td>
<td>Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, Japan</td>
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<td>MHLW</td>
<td>Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, Japan</td>
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<td>Ministry of Finance, Japan</td>
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<td>MEXT</td>
<td>Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Japan</td>
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<td>JTFC</td>
<td>Japan Trade Fair Commission</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non Government Organizations</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Program</td>
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<td>NPA</td>
<td>Non-Profit Organization</td>
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<td>IHA</td>
<td>International Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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</tbody>
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Tracking system and management of donated goods in Japan

1. Background

From the great floods of Thailand in 2011. One lesson we learned was that the involvement of many agencies in tracking and distributing donated goods creates potential confusion. During the last floods, quite a few organizations did not go through established channels when donating goods. Some went directly to provinces. Others worked with government agencies that established relationships with. It should also be noted here that since the Thai Government did not officially ask for assistance, many triggers normally used by international organization to provide assistance were not invoked. This likely also had a significant contribution to what channels were used for providing assistance. There are, in fact, a large number of stakeholders that are potentially involved in receiving, transporting and receiving good which creates a potentially confusing receiving good.

The National Disaster Prevention & Mitigation Plan BE 2553-2557 (2010-2014) mentions that the responsibilities for receiving and tracking international assistance are shared by different agencies, including DDPM which is the central government agency in charge of disaster prevention and mitigation. The problem, however is that Thailand does not have a database or system in place for receiving and tracking international donations. There appears to be no common national database system for receiving and tracking donations of goods. Even at the department level, the processes used to track goods depend on the individual official. As a staff member of DDPM, I foresee a growing interest in studying this issue. This challenge should be addressed so that donations can be effectively used to meet the needs of disaster victims in Thailand in the future.

The propose of research is to study tracking system donated goods and the management of donated goods in Japan.
2. The Great East JAPAN earthquake (GEJE)

2.1 Overview situation

The 2011 earthquake off the Pacific coast of Tōhoku often referred to in Japan as Higashi nihon daishinsai and also known as the 2011 Tohoku earthquake, the Great East Japan Earthquake, and the 3.11 Earthquake, was a magnitude 9.0 (Mw) undersea mega thrust earthquake off the coast of Japan that occurred at 14:46 on 11 March 2011, with the epicenter approximately 70 kilometres (43 mi) east of the Ojika Peninsula of Tōhoku and the hypocenter at an underwater depth of approximately 30 km (19 mi). It was the most powerful known earthquake ever to have hit Japan, and the fifth most powerful earthquake in the world since modern record-keeping began in 1900. The earthquake triggered powerful tsunami waves that reached heights of up to 40.5 metres (133 ft) in Miyako in Tōhoku's Iwate Prefecture, and which, in the Sendai area, travelled up to 10 km (6 mi) inland. The earthquake moved Honshu (the main island of Japan) 2.4 m (8 ft) east and shifted the Earth on its axis by estimates of between 10 cm (4 in) and 25 cm (10 in).

On 12 September 2012, a Japanese National Police Agency report confirmed 15,882 deaths, 6,142 injured, and 2,668 people missing across twenty prefectures, as well as 129,225 buildings totally collapsed, with a further 254,204 buildings 'half collapsed', and another 691,766 buildings partially damaged. The earthquake and tsunami also caused extensive and severe structural damage in north-eastern Japan, including heavy damage to roads and railways as well as fires in many areas, and a dam collapse. Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan said, "In the 65 years after the end of World War II, this is the toughest and the most difficult crisis for Japan." Around 4.4 million households in northeastern Japan were left without electricity and 1.5 million without water.

The tsunami caused nuclear accidents, primarily the level 7 meltdowns at three reactors in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant complex, and the associated evacuation zones affecting hundreds of thousands of residents. Many electrical generators were taken down, and at least three nuclear reactors suffered explosions due to hydrogen gas that had built up within their outer containment buildings after cooling system failure. Residents within a 20 km (12 mi) radius of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant and a 10 km (6.2 mi) radius of the Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Plant were evacuated. In addition, the U.S. recommended that its citizens evacuate up to 80 km (50 mi) of the plant.
Early estimates placed insured losses from the earthquake alone at US$14.5 to $34.6 billion. The Bank of Japan offered ¥15 trillion (US$183 billion) to the banking system on 14 March in an effort to normalize market conditions. The World Bank’s estimated economic cost was US$235 billion, making it the costliest natural disaster in world history.

2.2 International Assistance

The Government of Japan has received 138 offers of assistance from countries as well as 39 offers from international organizations. It has accepted relief items from 29 countries and international organizations. The Government says the need for further international assistance is limited and any support should clearly be in accordance with the Government of Japan’s criteria:

2.2.1 With regard to relief items, the Government of Japan has received offers for relief goods/material from many countries, and international organizations. The Government is identifying the needs and trying to match the offers with the identified needs for efficient and effective delivery. As the transportation and storage capacity is still limited, it is strongly recommended not to send any relief goods without coordination with the Government or the local authorities.

2.2.2 Concerning offers of assistance by NGOs, the Government of Japan states that due to the shortage of petrol and damages to infrastructure in the affected areas, International NGOs are recommended to wait until the situation improves before commencing activities that are completely self-sustainable and with a local partner. WFP is planning to provide 20 mobile warehouses. The warehouses will be used by Peace Boat and JEN. WFP is also planning to hold a training workshop for Japanese NGOs so that they can set up the warehouses by themselves. WFP is also ready to provide prefabricated housing to NGOs. OCHA has officially ended its support role in-country to the Government of Japan for the emergency. NGO consortia Japan Platform and Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation will take the lead in information exchange and coordination of international NGOs with their local partners.
3. Disaster Management System of Japan

3.1 LEGAL BASIS

Various disaster management related laws adopted since late 40s has laid down the legal framework for the disaster management system of Japan. These laws cover all phases of disaster management – preparedness, prevention/mitigation, response and recovery/rehabilitation phases. According to the latest brochure of Disaster Management System in Japan, only 3 laws has been enacted to regulate disaster response activities at national level: 1) Disaster Relief Act - 1947 year 2) Fire Services Act -1948 year 3) Flood Control Act – 1949 year - whereas the numbers of the laws regulating other phases of disaster management are considerably more: 7 Basic Acts; 18 with regard to Disaster Prevention and Preparedness; 23 Disaster Recovery and Reconstruction and Financial Measures [5; 6-7 p.] Given the interconnectedness of these laws, major aspects of some other laws will also be highlighted, while the main focus will be put on disaster response laws.

Disaster Relief Act – The purpose of the law is to provide essential emergency relief in the event of a disaster through the cooperation of local governments, non-governmental organizations, such as the Japanese Red Cross Society, and the general public, so as to protect the disaster victims and maintain social order. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 of the DRA
set the framework for the government policy with regard to costs management and reimbursement and penal provisions related with disaster relief activities. In the case of emergency relief, the Disaster Relief Act is referred to for matters such as rescue operations and the state contribution to relief expenses, for which the law has specific provisions. Under the Act, relief is provided only in the event of, for example, the destruction of a certain number of houses relative to the population of the municipality or municipalities concerned due to a disaster. (Example: At least 30 households have their dwellings destroyed through total structural collapse in a municipality with a population of less than 5,000). The extent, methods and duration of relief are to be specified by the Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW). The MHLW plays key role in implementation of DRA during disaster times as a central supervisory and coordinating body. As stipulated by the law, relief is provided by a prefectural governor with the assistance of his municipal mayors. Where necessary, the prefectural governor may delegate part of his authority to municipal mayors. The Act defines the responsibility of the prefectural governor as follows;

*The prefectural governor shall constantly endeavor to formulate required plans, establish powerful relief organizations, and provide for labor, facilities, equipment, supplies and funding to ensure fully effective.*

The following types of relief activities are defined by the Disaster Relief Act: setting up of places of refuge and emergency temporary housing; supply of food and water; supply of clothing, bedding, etc; rescue of disaster victims; emergency repair of houses. Provision of school supplies Burial arrangements; search for deceased victims and body treatment; removal of debris and other obstacles in and around dwellings

### 3.2 OVERVIEW OF THE DISASTER MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

Likewise, its national government system, disaster management in Japan is also vested on 3-layered system – national, prefectural and municipal layers. Disaster management system of Japan has undergone tremendous advancement throughout the past 5-6 decades. Disaster Management Councils established at each level and each council is responsible for the implementation of all disaster management related issues under its authority. The comprehensive coordination and communication system has been put in place to foster holistic and effective management at each level. The outline of Disaster Management System of Japan, the structure of Central Disaster Management Council established under the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act (DCBA) as well as Disaster Management Planning System based on the same law is shown below:

The enactment of the DCBA is considered to be the turning point in the history of modern disaster management system of Japan. Adopted in 1961, two years after the Ise-wan Typhoon which caused tremendous destructions and loss of more 5000 people,
the DCBA defined protection of national land as well as citizens’ lives, livelihoods, and property from natural disasters as a national priority.

The DCBA lays down the national level framework for the disaster management. The act has provisions governing the following matters: Definition of responsibilities of disaster management, Disaster Management Organizations, Disaster Management Planning System, Disaster Prevention and Preparedness, Disaster Emergency Response, Disaster Recovery and Rehabilitation, Financial Measures, State of Disaster Emergency. The Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act and related laws complement each other as general legislation and detailed legislation, the latter consisting of specific laws established in response to various specific needs. In the event of a disaster, specific laws are first applied depending on the nature of the disaster, and the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Law is only invoked where there are no provisions in these laws mentioned as stated earlier.

The DCBA which covers all phases of disaster management and stipulates establishment of disaster management councils at three levels: national – Central Disaster Management Council; Prefectural – Local Disaster Management Council and Municipal Disaster Management Councils as well as defines organization and duties of these councils and defines conditions for establishment of headquarters for disaster control in case of emergency.

**Figure 1. Basic Scheme of the DCBA**
Figure 2. Outline of the disaster management system in Japan
(Source: www.bousai.go.jp)
Central Disaster Management Council consists of the prime minister, who is the chairperson, Minister of State for Disaster Management, all ministers, heads of major public institutions and experts. The council promotes comprehensive disaster countermeasures including deliberating important issues on disaster reduction according to requests from the Prime Minister or Minister of State for Disaster Management. Duties of the council include formulating and promoting implementation of the Basic Disaster Management Plan and Earthquake Countermeasures Plans, formulating and promoting implementation of the urgent measures plan for major disasters, deliberating important issues on disaster reduction according to requests from the Prime Minister or Minister of State for Disaster Management (basic disaster management policies, overall coordination of disaster countermeasures and declaration of state of disaster emergency) and offering opinions regarding important issues on disaster reduction to the Prime Minister and Minister of State for Disaster Management.

Figure 3. Composition of Central Disaster Management Council
(Source: www.bousai.go.jp)
Disaster management planning in Japan is implemented at three levels:

1. Basic Disaster Management Plan is prepared by the Central Disaster Management Council and basis plan for disaster management activities. The plan must be based on Disaster Countermeasure Basic Act. The structure of it is as shown in the figure below:

2. Disaster Management Operation Plan is made by each designated government organization and designated public corporation based on the Basic Disaster Management Plan

3. Local Disaster Management Plan is made by prefectural and municipal disaster management councils, subject to local circumstances and based on Basic Disaster Management Plan.
Mission of the Cabinet Office
Along with a series of reforms of the central government system in 2001, the post of Minister of State for Disaster Management was newly established to integrate and coordinate disaster reduction policies and measures of ministries and agencies. In the Cabinet Office, which is responsible for securing cooperation and collaboration among related government organizations in wide-ranging issues, the Director-General for Disaster Management is mandated to undertake the planning of basic disaster management policies and response to large-scale disasters, as well as conduct overall coordination.

Additionally, taking into account the lessons learned from the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, the Cabinet Secretariat system was also strengthened, including the appointment of the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management and the establishment of the Cabinet Information Collection Center, to strengthen risk management functions to address emergencies such as large-scale disasters and serious accidents. Thereby, the Cabinet Office has a role in supporting the Cabinet Secretariat regarding disaster management matters.

Organization of National Government and Cabinet Office

![Diagram of the Organization of National Government and Cabinet Office]

**Figure 5. Organization of National Government and Cabinet Office**

(Source: www.adrc.asia)

(1) Outline of Disaster Response

The national and local governments need to quickly collect and share disaster and damage information, and secure communications so that they can carry out effective emergency activities such as search and rescue and medical operations. Based on such information, local governments set up a disaster management headquarters and related organizations establish their own operations mechanism.

The national government collects disaster information at the Cabinet Information Collection Center 24 hours a day. When a large-scale disaster strikes, an emergency team composed of the director generals of the respective ministries and agencies gathers immediately at the Crisis Management Center in the Prime Minister's Office to grasp and analyze the disaster situation, and report the results to the Prime Minister. Inter-ministerial meetings at the ministerial or high-ranking senior-official level are held to decide basic response policies if necessary. According to the level of damage, the government may establish a Headquarters for Major Disaster Management (headed by the Minister of State for Disaster Management) or a Headquarters for Extreme Disaster Management (headed by the Prime Minister).

Additionally, a government investigation team headed by the Minister of State for Disaster Management may be dispatched, or an onsite response headquarters maybe established.

(2) Wide-area Support System

In the case of large-scale disasters that exceed the response capabilities of the affected local government, various wide-area support mechanisms are mobilized by the National Police Agency (Interprefectural Emergency Rescue Unit), Fire and Disaster Management Agency (Emergency Fire Rescue Team), and Japan Coast Guard. Furthermore, the Self-Defense Forces can be dispatched for emergency response activities upon request from the governor of the affected prefectural government.

Also, the disaster medical assistance teams (DMATs) will be dispatched to provide wide-area medical-transport services. These teams transport severely injured persons via Self-Defense Forces vehicles to hospitals outside the struck zone.
Figure 6. Cabinet Office Disaster Response Mechanism
(Source: http://www.bousai.go.jp)
In Japan's disaster management system, it is the responsibility of the affected municipalities to respond to disasters, and only in extreme cases do the related prefectures support the municipalities by carrying out overall coordination efforts.

Furthermore, when even the prefectures are having difficulty handling the situation the national government steps in to help.

For large-scale disasters affecting wide areas, the Prefectural Emergency Relief Headquarters is expected to play a central role in the recovery process.

Figure 7. Disaster Response Mechanism
(Source: http://www.bousai.go.jp)
Figure 8. Outline of Government Headquarters in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE)  
(Source: http://japan.kantei.go.jp/incident/outline_110509.pdf)
5. National Response in the Great East JAPAN earthquake (GEJE)

(Source: Japan Earthquake and Tsunami Situation Report No.16, UNOCHA, http://www.unocha.org.)

5.1 Coordination

The Government of Japan’s Emergency Management agencies are leading the response through the Emergency Response Team, headed by Prime Minister Naoto Kan. Information from the Government of Japan. The Chief Cabinet Secretary’s Office is responsible for coordinating volunteer groups and NGOs through its Volunteers Coordination Unit.

A network of NGO/volunteer organizations “Japan Civil Network for Disaster Relief in East Japan” has been established in order to facilitate the communication and exchange of information among the organizations working in Tohoku area to support the survivors. The aim of the network is to coordinate the assistance provided in Tohoku area by the NGOs/volunteer organizations. Coordination of international NGOs and their local partners will be provided by Japan Platform and JANIC. The next inter-agency meeting is scheduled for the 2 April in Tokyo.

5.2 Infrastructure

The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport reports that most of the Tohoku region’s main land, sea and air routes are open. 99 percent of highways and main routes have been repaired, except for those near the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant. More than 37,200 vehicles are now passing through the Tohoku Expressway per day, 1.3 times more than the regular traffic before the earthquake due to the large number of emergency vehicles. Express buses are carrying 4,660 passengers per day into and out of the region, 2.4 times more than that before the disaster. However, many local roads and residential roads in the affected area are still impassable, blocked with debris and this is hampering the delivery of aid to those staying in their own homes and in smaller evacuation centers.

All ports and airports are now open, except for Sendai Airport which is reserved for humanitarian aid. In other airports 71 per cent of domestic flights have resumed. Railway tracks are open for 62 percent of bullet trains and 60 per cent of local trains. The interim assessment of the East Japan Railway Company has assessed half of the total railway tracks and found that 23 train stations and 22 km worth of railway tracks have been completely washed away in the region.

Electricity has been restored by 96.3 percent in Tohoku, leaving only 180,000 households without power. Gas supplies have been restored to roughly 32 per cent of households and 340,000 households remain without. Because 4 out of 7 supply bases of liquefied petroleum (LP) gas are not operational, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry will release 40,000 tons from the national reserve for the first time from 4 April.
To date, 87.9 per cent of water has been restored to buildings and only 260,000 households in eight prefectures are still without running water. Currently 320 water trucks are deployed and 200 more will shortly deliver water to those without access to tap water.

Regardless of the on-going recovery, the fuel shortage remains a serious issue in the affected areas, exacerbated by a limited number of operational fuel stations and increasing needs. The Government plans to spend US$210 million (1.7 billion JPY) to procure of tankers and install makeshift fuel stations.

5.3 Shelter

The construction of temporary shelters is continuing in the affected prefectures. Some prefectures have revised their plans upwards in order to respond to the needs. Iwate Prefecture announced that they are increasing the number of temporary shelters from 8,800 to 18,000, which will cover 40,000 to 50,000 people. Miyagi Prefecture which is requesting 10,000 houses be built has announced that construction of 1,195 shelters will start on the 5 April in 11 towns and cities. Currently, construction is underway for 1,207 shelters.

The challenge is to find suitable land to construct the houses, as the coastal area of Tohoku is mountainous and it is difficult to find flat land. The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and transportation says that only 8 percent of the land needed for the construction has been secured so far. The plan is to have 30,000 temporary shelters built by mid May. According to the National Policy Agency 70,409 families are living in evacuation centres.

In order to allow evacuees to have better access to basic services while waiting for the temporary shelters, the Government is trying to find available public/government housing which can accommodate evacuee families. 42,145 public/government housings units across 47 prefectures are available for displaced families. In Tokyo prefecture, 600 families have been allocated vacant public housing units yesterday, free of charge, for a period of 6 months.

Starting in May 2011, the Government will provide $10,000 (1 million JPY) to each family who lost their homes. Movements from evacuation centres to temporary shelters will soon intensify, and financial support to families will be indispensable.

5.4 WASH

Access to water has been restored to more than 1.9 million households over the past three weeks and the priority is to regain access for the remaining 260,000 households (or 10 per cent who have been affected), according to the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. More than 400 water supply companies across the country have now established emergency water supply systems to provide water trucking service to the affected prefectures. 189 water supply vehicles are operating in Miyagi, 84 in Iwate and 35
in Fukushima. The Ministry has secured 520 vehicles in total and has maintained the deployment of about 320 vehicles.

Assessments have revealed that additional sewage systems in Miyagi, Iwate and Fukushima are not functioning or have been damaged, according to the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism. In Miyagi, there are 66 facilities that are not functioning or damaged, 18 in Iwate and 14 in Fukushima. More than 2,405 professionals from the Ministry, prefectural governments and various sewage associations have been deployed to the affected areas and 210 professionals are currently on the ground to help repair the sewage systems.

More than 5.5 million bottles of water have been delivered to evacuation centres and hospitals, according to the Emergency Disaster Response Headquarters reports. This is more than twice of what was delivered within one week after the disaster. Another 1 million bottles are in transit or being distributed. Meanwhile, a lack of clean water for evacuees' personal hygiene is posing public health risks in some evacuation centres. Media reports that the Ishinomaki Red Cross Hospital found that sanitation and hygiene environment is deteriorating in 30 per cent of the 314 evacuation centres that they have assessed in Ishinomaki, Higashi-Matsushima and Onagawa in Miyagi. Excreta disposal is a particular challenge. The local social welfare office is conducting a training on drainage work and maintenance of toilets.

Ministries such as the Ministry of Defense have provided bathing services to 1.2 million people so far. For evacuees not being able to wash regularly or change their clothes is a particular hardship.

5.5 Health

Tohoku University reports that cases of pneumonia among the elderly living in evacuation centres in Miyagi are increasing. During 20 to 26 March, the University received 40 referrals from two local hospitals, a level 10 times above the average. Amidst such fears of rising prevalence of infectious diseases and flu among the evacuees, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare announced that 142 medical teams of 640 professionals from across the country are currently responding mainly in Miyagi, Iwate and Fukushima. In addition, more than 630 pharmacists, 250 nurses, 110 public health officers, nutritionists, dentists and other medical professionals have been deployed to evacuation centres and hospitals. 20 teams of 95 professionals are also catering to psychosocial needs and 280 care-givers are attending to people with disabilities and people who require nursing. About 8,000 additional care-givers are on standby. About 400 child welfare specialists are also on standby and 17 have been deployed to Iwate so far.
Hospitals providing emergency response services in the three most affected prefectures are gradually building back capacity. Of the 33 major hospitals in these prefectures, 26 are now accepting both inpatients and outpatients. Media reports that sufficient medical supplies are now reaching key hospitals. The challenge is the onward distribution to a network of local hospitals and clinics, which is being hampered by lack of pharmacists.

In the meantime, the nationwide mobilization of medical assistance continues. In the non-affected prefectures, there are more than 390 public hospitals with about 3,400 available beds. Social welfare facilities have identified accommodation facilities for at least 35,000 elderly, 8,700 people with disabilities, 7,100 children and 900 people with other protection needs. So far, 690 people have moved into these facilities. One of the major health concerns is the continuity of treatment for patients with serious illnesses and chronic diseases, such as cancer and diabetes. Medical institutions in non-affected prefectures are now publicizing services available for these patients on their websites.

346 domestic Emergency Response Units and medical teams of the Japanese Red Cross Society (JRCS) have completed their mission, 27 remain in the three most affected prefectures and 117 are on standby. JRCS has also handed out more than 125,500 blankets, 26,100 emergency kits (including radios, flashlights and other supplies), 11,000 sleeping kits (including pillows, camping mats, ear plugs, etc.) and clothing to families in evacuation centres.

5.6 Food

The Emergency Disaster Response Headquarters reports that an estimated 14 million meals have been delivered to evacuation centres and hospitals in the affected areas to date. Approximately 1.5 million meals were delivered on 30 and 31 March. In addition, approximately 3 million meals are in transit. The figure does not include distribution of food items by municipalities, NGOs, private sector, and Japan’s Self Defence Force.

5.7 Education

While the academic year is due to start in April, many schools in the three prefectures of Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima are not able to resume their classes, as a large number of schools have either been damaged by the earthquake and tsunami or are being used as evacuation centres. In the three worst affected areas, approximately 1,700 (70 per cent) of public schools have been damaged, and among them, 291 primary and junior high schools have so far no prospect of resuming their classes. Each prefecture is considering using unused public facilities in other locations to minimize the delay to school opening. Many teachers are also missing or dead. The mayor of Ishinomaki in Miyagi says he is finding it difficult to propose that people sheltering in schools should vacate to another destination before classes resume on the 21 April.
The prefectures of Hiroshima, Tokushima and Yamaguchi are considering sending 145 teachers to the three most affected northern prefectures. However, they are not able to receive them at this stage as accommodation and food are still lacking on the ground. The teachers have been requested to wait until such time that the three prefectures are ready.

The Prefecture of Iwate, together with the Ministry of Education, is considering establishing boarding schools for children orphaned from the disaster. However, the number of orphans is yet to be established, and concrete plans will have to be made after a proper needs assessment. The Ministry is ready to discuss similar plans with the municipalities in Miyagi and Fukushima Prefectures, if requested.

5.8 Agriculture

Although the total damage is yet to be determined, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries estimates that nearly 24,000 hectares, 2.6 per cent of agricultural land have been damaged by the tsunami in six prefectures, Aomori, Iwate, Miyagi, Fukushima, Ibaraki and Chiba. The worst-hit was Shichigahamamachi, Iwate, where 93.4 per cent of land was washed away or inundated. As Tohoku is the biggest rice producing zone in Japan, rice fields account for 85 per cent of the total damage. As for fisheries, over 18,500 fishing vessels are reportedly damaged or lost. In the 3 worst affected prefectures, Miyagi, Iwate and Fukushima, the damage is 87.9 percent.

Only 4 percent of 14,200 registered fishing vessels were not damaged in Iwate. Similarly, the damage to fishing ports has also been severe. Nearly all fishing ports in the three prefectures have sustained significant damage. Considering that agriculture and fisheries are one of the biggest industries in Tohoku Region, reconstruction of these sectors will be critical for the reconstruction of livelihoods.

5.9 Funding

Individuals and private sector companies, along with countries and aid organizations have contributed and pledged a total of $ 951 million bilaterally to the Government of Japan, Red Cross Societies, NGOs and other partners to support relief efforts, according to the Financial Tracking Service. The amount reported in the FTS has nearly doubled over the past week and more than 91 per cent of the contributions continue to be funds raised from the private sector. The Japanese Red Cross Society received a record $725 million from more than 1.1 million local donations. The Japanese diplomatic establishments abroad have received $12 million, according to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
6. Coordination Disaster Relief during the Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE).

6.1 Government

6.1.1 Cabinet office

1) Coordination of international Disaster Relief

- **Institutional Arrangement**

  **Basic Disaster Management Plan** (excepts)

  The plan was revised in July 1995 after the Great Hanshin – Awaji Earthquake to define procedures to accept and facilitate international disaster relief.

  **Chapter 1 Disaster Prevention**

  - The government should prepare procedure necessary to accept and facilitate international relief.

  **Chapter 2 Emergency Response**

  - When an offer for relief is reached from aboard, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should notify the Government Disaster Management Headquarters of its type, expected, arrival date and destination.

  - The government Headquarters should determine whether to accept the offer.

  - When the government accepts the offer, a plan for facilitating the relief should be prepared according to the pre-defined policy and be notified to the offering country as well as related ministries and local governments.

- **Inter- Ministerial Agreement**

  An Inter- Ministerial Agreement was drafted in 1998 to assess concrete area of relief and determine responsible ministries.

  Potential Areas of International Relief and Responsible Ministries (Partial list).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential Areas</th>
<th>Responsible Ministries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Search and rescue (including handling of rescue dogs)</td>
<td>National Police Agency, Fire and disaster Management Agency, Ministry of Agriculture (for quarantine), Ministry of Justice (for immigration)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical staff</td>
<td>Ministry of Health, labour and welfare, Ministry of Justice (for immigration)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>food</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>water</td>
<td>Ministry of Health, labour and welfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily essentials</td>
<td>Ministry of Economy, Trad and Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monetary aid</td>
<td>Cabinet Office</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Potential Areas of International Relief and Responsible Ministries.
(Source: Takeo Murakami, Cabinet office of Japan)
2) Government Disaster Management Headquarters

(1) Structure of the Headquarters and; (2) International Coordination Team

Figure 9. Government Disaster Management Headquarters
(Source: Takeo Murakami, Cabinet office of Japan)
(3) Key Activities and Dates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Key Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| March 11, 2011 | 1) Evening, notification from MoFA of first international offers (8 offers as at 6 pm)  
                   2) Night, establishment of the team in Emergency Operations Centre (ca.10pm) |
| March 12, 2011 | 1) Korea (1st) and Singapore SAR teams arrived, requested NPA to cooperate       |
| March 13, 2011 | 2) Germany, Switzerland, USA, China, UK and New Zealand teams arrived, requested  
                   3) FDMA to cooperate (SAR teams continued to arrive during March)             |
| March 14, 2011 | 4) Relief goods from China (900 tents, 2,000 blankets and 200 flashlights) arrived (goods continued to arrive during March and April) |
| March 17, 2011 | 5) Issued an advisory to relevant ministries on facilitation of International relief goods |
| March 20, 2011 | 6) Launch of the Headquarters for Supporting the Lives of Disaster Victims        |
| March 23, 2011 | 7) MoFA issued an advisory to its diplomatic missions on needed goods             |
| March 27, 2011 | 8) Medical team from Israel arrived                                              
                   (the only full-fledged medical team)                                           |
| March 30, 2011 | 9) An offer list of relief goods provided to affected municipalities               |
| April 20, 2011 | 10) Free domestic transport services provided by DHL                              |
| May 9, 2011    | 11) The team downsized and merged with other teams                               |

Table 2. Key Activities and Dates.  
(Source: Takeo Murakami, Cabinet office of Japan)
(4) Key Results

Humanitarian Aid

The Government Headquarters provided the following services in order to facilitate SAR teams:

1) review of team capacities before arrival
2) designation of cooperating agencies
3) facilitation of immigration procedures
4) transport to the designated site (as appropriate) in cooperation with relevant ministries.

The following SAR teams were facilitated by the headquarters:

Republic of Korea, Singapore, Germany, Switzerland, United States, China, United Kingdom, New Zealand, Mexico, Australia, France, Taiwan, Russia, Mongolia, South Africa, Turkey, India.

Goods Aid

The Government Headquarters facilitated distribution of relief goods offered by foreign governments by studying and developing local needs from affected municipalities and matching them with the offers. The headquarters also supported domestic transport and interim storage as necessary.

The following list shows examples of relief goods that the Government Headquarters matched with needs. Offered country names are indicated in parenthesis.

Coats (Israel), socks (ROK), underwear and socks (Viet Nam), water (ROK, Thailand), retort food packages (Singapore), corn flakes (Thailand), canned foods (Kazakhstan and Indonesia), tea bags (Sri Lanka), coffee beans (Tanzania), masks (Thailand), towels (Viet Nam), blankets (Mongolia, France, Turkey, ROK and Thailand)
(5) Role of Government Headquarters in Facilitating SAR teams.

The Government Headquarters requested Fire and Disaster Management Agency (FDMA) and National Policy Agency (NPA) to cooperate with SAR teams. It also supported immigration and domestic transport. At the local level, liaison officers from MoFA coordinated with SAR teams.

Figure 10. Role of Government Headquarters in Facilitating SAR teams.
(Source: Takeo Murakami, Cabinet office of Japan)
(6) Role of Government Headquarters in Facilitating Relief Goods

Since it was difficult to utilize the mass procurement and mass-shipping channel within the headquarters, the directly contact municipalities and match their needs with offered goods. The majority of goods were transported by offering countries.

Figure 11. Role of Government Headquarters in Facilitating Relief Goods.
(Source: Takeo Murakami, Cabinet office of Japan)
Lesson learned in the GEGE (By Cabinet Office, Government of Japan)

About Humanitarian aid

(1) Facilitation of SAR Teams From Early Stage
- Because of the magnitude of the disaster and the disruption of communication tools, it was practically impossible at earlier stage to match the offered supports with actual needs of the disaster-affected area – which was against the procedures prescribed in the operations manual.
- In anticipation of future disasters where the grasp of local needs might be difficult during the initial 2-3 days, rules and procedures for rapidly determining the acceptance of foreign SAR teams at the national level and sending them to the affected area should be developed.
- On the other hand, the entry of the SAR teams to the country was facilitated with the full support from the ministries responsible for customs, immigration and quarantine (CIQ).

(2) Domestic Transport of SAR Teams
- Self Defense Forces (SDF) provided transport services to a number of SAR teams that did not have their own means of transport. However, as the amount of SDF’s own operations grew, it became difficult to rely only on SDF in providing transport services.
- On the other hand, many SAR teams moved by their own, by hiring trucks and buses, bringing them from their own countries or requesting support from US Forces Japan.
- At times of large disasters, as the operating agencies will be occupied with their own operations and may lack the capacity to provide transport services, it might be realistic to
- On the other hand, the Government Headquarters should facilitate the activities of international SAR teams by designating their vehicles as emergency vehicles and/or rationing gasoline along with domestic rescue agencies.

(3) Coordination with Local Forces
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs dispatched its staff as liaison officers that accompanied to SAR teams and supported their activities in the affected area. This had facilitated local coordination.
- However, there was confusion about the equipment and the roles of the liaison officers. It is necessary to formalise the work of liaison officers by prescribing them in a manual.
(4) Support from US Forces Japan

- Initially there were some cases where the Government Headquarters coordinated offers of support from USFJ. Majority of cases were handled directly by SDF or relevant ministries.
- Ministry of Defense later declared to serve as the focal point for any kind of request to USFJ. Similar arrangement should be established in advance in preparation for future disasters.

(5) Medical Teams

- Along with SAR teams, offers of support to dispatch medical teams were made from various countries. Their acceptance was quite limited, however, because of the lack of local needs.
- It is understandable that the affected communities feel reluctant to accept medical teams because of linguistic and cultural barriers.
- Moreover, measures to deal with potential claims against injuries and damages by SAR or medical teams should be prepared.

About Good aid

(6) Matching the offers with needs

- Initially, efforts were made in the Government Headquarters to use Team C4 (goods coordination team) as the focal point and find out the needs from affected areas that can be met or complimented by foreign relief goods. It turned out difficult, however, to combine the foreign relief goods whose specifications, amounts and arrival dates were unclear as part of the supply stock, while it was the urgent requirement for Team C4 to transport domestically procured goods in a large volume and at once.
- On the other hand, local needs at municipal level became gradually clear and Team C7 in the Government Headquarters decided to conduct matching based on local information it collected with the support from prefectural international offices or through direct phone calls to municipal offices.
- Specifications of goods, such as quality, taste and shape, often differ from those of goods found in Japan. Matching was therefore made with due care, with such efforts as checking the taste beforehand by Japanese mission and then sharing the details with municipal officials.
- In this way, matching of foreign goods takes time. Moreover, it takes longer time to ship good to Japan. It sometimes happened that the needs vanished before the goods arrived.
- For future, it might be considered to accept foreign relief goods without completing matching. In order to do this, the issue of domestic transport, should be cleared.
(7) **Domestic transport and interim storage of goods**

- The issue of who will bear the burden of expenses was raised.
- Disaster Relief Act and related national subsidy were not utilised for transporting foreign relief goods because the law considered prefectures as primary relief bodies while the matching of foreign goods was made primarily with municipalities. Another reason was that the application of Disaster Relief Act seemed inappropriate for goods that were offered by foreign countries.
- The use of Cabinet Office’s reserved fund for fiscal year 2010 was also considered but only applied to one case. It was difficult to complete matching and confirm origins and destinations of transport by end of the fiscal year (March). Another obstacle was the fact that the fund was applicable only to the three most severely damaged prefectures (Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima).
- Consequently, majority of foreign relief goods were transported domestically by the offering countries. Nonetheless, considering the fact that when Japan provides relief goods to disaster affected countries it only transports goods to national hub airports, the assisting countries might have been overburdened.
- Even if Disaster Relief Act or the reserve fund was used, it might have been difficult to use them to such activities as storing and sorting goods at the arriving airport and packing several goods for the same destination. Therefore, it is necessary to consider in advance the ways in which expenses for domestic transport of relief goods from abroad, especially from foreign countries.

(8) **Partnership between international organizations and private companies.**

- In addition to the above cases, some international organizations and private companies offered domestic transport for some of the foreign relief goods for free of charge. Other companies also provided a warehouse at Narita Airport and the management of the warehouse for free. Moreover, although with limited results, partnership with NGOs was also sought. In order to facilitate goods transport and matching for future disasters, utilisation of those external resources should be studied.

(9) **Strengthening of the government Headquarter.**

- As clearly shown this time, coordination of human aid will be needed and should start immediately after a disaster strikes. It is therefore necessary to conduct certain preparatory works such as securing staff and conducting drills. The utilisation of staff in Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) that has expertise in emergency relief should also be considered.
- Matching of relief goods requires certain amount of staff. Because the coordination with municipalities may not finish in one day, it is advisable to assign staff for the same task for a certain duration of time instead of rotating them day by day.
As the nature of human and goods aid from abroad changes as the emergency response phase progresses, it is necessary to flexibly secure needed staff for each phase.

Even though international assistance has already been included in the government’s table top drills, the scenario should be improved reflecting the experience for this time.

(10) Clarifying condition for accepting international relief.

In order to avoid rejection, inconsistency or confusion when accepting international relief, it is necessary to clarify in advance the conditions as much as possible and show them to offering countries when a disaster strikes. It should also be promoted to share information about Japan’s system for accepting international relief with other countries.

6.1.2 The Roles of Municipality, Prefectural and Central government

The Disaster Relief Act of the Roles of Municipality, Prefectural and Central government.

- Application of the Disaster Relief Act (decisions taken by prefectural governors) The Act is applied in all municipalities in Iwate Prefecture, Miyagi Prefecture, and Fukushima Prefecture. The Act is applied in 113 municipalities in other 7 prefectures.

- Flexible enforcement of the Disaster Relief Act

All prefectural governments, including those prefectures not affected by the disaster, were notified of the implementation of the flexible enforcement of the Disaster Relief Act, so that even prefectural governments not affected by the disaster could actively rescue evacuees. Specifically, it was clarified that when prefectures not affected by the earthquake set up evacuation shelters and temporary housings or rent ryokans (Japanese-style inns) and hotels, a considerable amount of the cost was funded by the Government (depending on the financial capability of the affected Local Governments).

The following are main roles of central government, prefecture and municipality in public help (FDMA (2007), Fukushima Prefecture (2008).

1) Roles of municipality

1) Damage assessment, counting of affected people, report to prefecture
2) Assessment of affected people’s needs
3) Distribution of materials procured as stockpiles and distribution stock materials to affected people
4) Request to prefecture about materials beyond municipality’s procurement capacity
5) Acceptance of procured materials from central government and prefecture and donated materials and their distribution

6) Food distribution

2) Roles of prefecture

1) Damage assessment and counting of affected people
2) Compiling affected people’s needs assessments
3) Distribution of materials procured as distribution stock materials
4) Coordination of relief materials across prefectures
5) Request to central government about material beyond prefecture’s procurement capacity
6) Receipt of materials procured by central government as well as donated materials and distribution to municipalities

3) Roles of central government

1) Damage assessment and counting of affected people
2) Compiling affected people’s needs assessments
3) Material procurement by distribution stock materials and under support agreement
4) Coordination of relief materials across prefectures
5) Request to central government about material beyond prefecture’s procurement capacity
6) Coordination of donated materials

Municipal government has primary responsibility in disaster emergency response. When a disaster is large scale and is under Disaster Relief Act, prefecture conducts disaster relief activities. Materials are purchased from private companies within the prefecture and procured from other prefectures under regional support system. Disaster Relief Act stipulates prefecture has primary responsibility to conduct disaster relief while it is approved to partially charge municipalities with authorities of disaster relief. Thus prefecture and municipality share responsibilities of their roles in fact.

As stipulated in Basic Disaster Prevention Plan, when a disaster is large scale and beyond prefecture’s capacity, affected local government makes request of material procurement to relevant ministries (Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare: water and medical supplies, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries: rice owned by government, request of food shipping, Ministry of Economy and Industry: daily commodities, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications: communication equipments, Fire and Disaster Management Agency: coordination of materials provided by unaffected prefectures, Ministry of Defense: food and water distribution to affected people, Japan Coast Guard: water distribution). According to Central Disaster Management Council (2007), the country should
prepare the following materials as regional procurement: food including rice, bread, rice ball, lunch box, instant noodle, powdered milk for baby, canned food, retort pouch food and water in PET bottle; daily necessities including underwear, blanket, working clothes, towel, engine, portable cooking stove and gas cylinder. On the other hand, about donated materials provided by many individuals and groups for free, the country should announce the public should avoid sending the donated materials to affected municipalities because they are chaotic in the beginning of disaster occurrence. Also, the country should coordinate donated materials when affected municipalities hope to accept donated materials.

4) Role of central government in relief material management

In the Great East Japan Earthquake, while roles of central government, prefecture and municipality were quite different in accordance with degree of impacts, they are consistent with those described in the section 1.2 mentioned above. Roles of prefectures and municipalities are mentioned in Chapter 3. The following are two major roles that central government played. One is material procurement/transport coordination in Emergency Disaster Headquarters (special headquarters) set up for about forty days from 11 March to 20 April. The other is a consolidated transport scheme by Self Defense Force about relief materials from local government and private sector which was announced on 16 March.

Immediately after the earthquake on 11 March, transport coordination team and material coordination team were set up in administrative operation group (Group C) in Emergency Disaster Headquarters with a total of 15 and 22 officials respectively. As special headquarters on life support of affected people were set up on 20 March, they were reorganized as transport and communications team and material coordination team with a total of 17 and 27 officials respectively. Utilizing materials provided by companies for free and 30.2 billion yen for FY2012 reserve, food equivalent to 26.21 million meals, 7.94 million bottles of beverage, daily commodities like toilet paper, blanket, diaper, proprietary drug and mask were procured and transported to affected areas, basically prefectural stockyard. For transportation, about 1,900 trucks arranged by Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transportation and Tourism and Japan Trucking Association, 150 aircrafts of Air Self Defense Force, 5 helicopters from police and private sector, 8 vessels. Maximum delivery amount per day is 1.13 million meals. Regarding material procurement and transportation coordination, please refer to Cabinet Office (2011) in charge of disaster.

The other role by central government is consolidated transport scheme by Self Defense Force (See Figure5). Self Defense Force, in collaboration with group of governors, established reception counter at prefectural government offices, transporting donated materials brought at Ground Self Defense Force camps at each prefecture to affected areas.
Aircrafts transported about 1,000 tons of materials to Fukushima, Matsushima and Hanamaki airports by May. Most of materials transported by the aircrafts were sent to prefectural stockyard. On the other hand, trucks transported about 1,150 materials by September. It is said that consolidated transport scheme by Self Defense Force helped reduce burden of Emergency Disaster Headquarters in material procurement and transport coordination. However, this might have worsened material pileup in prefectural and municipal stockyard though transport bases of Self Defense Force did not have material pileup. In the beginning of the scheme, reception counter at prefecture meant to transport materials provided by prefecture, municipality, and private sector excluding individual. But as prefectures and municipalities had accepted relief materials from individuals and groups, a large amount of materials were delivered to affected areas with no specification on boxes or boxes containing multiple types of items. As a result, material beyond capacity of prefectures and municipalities accumulated, accelerating suspension of accepting at prefectural and municipal stockyards. Also, since prefecture stopped accepting materials, some donated materials lost destination and delivered in nearly six months after the quake. By the way, Self Defense Force transported about 1,800 tons by air and about 700 tons under material procurement and transport coordination operation by the above-mentioned Emergency Disaster Headquarters (special headquarters) in addition to the consolidated transport scheme.
Figure 12. Outline of Disaster Relief Act
(Source: Ministry of Land and Infrastructure, the relief material issues at the Great East Japan Earthquake)
6.2 Non Government Organizations (NGOs), International Non-Governmental Organization Coordination (INGO) and Volunteer

6.2.1 Japanese Red Cross (JRC)

The JRC is specified as a “Designated Public Corporation” under the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act. According to the Disaster Relief Act, the JRC is obligated to cooperate with the national and prefectural governments in the provision of relief assistance, the details of which are laid out in the agreement signed by the Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare and the President of the JRC. Based on this, the JRC is developing disaster relief responses according to relief regulations and disaster management plans. Additionally, as a member of the Central Disaster Management Council headed by the Prime Minister, and in collaboration with other organizations, the JRC is responsible for a part of the country’s overall disaster management. JRC’s activities:

**Medical Relief**

In order to be prepared for disasters, the JRC has formed 500 medical relief teams (approximately 7,000 people) comprised primarily of doctors and nurses from the 92 Red Cross Hospitals across the nation. At the time of disaster, response teams (6 members per team) and DERU (domestic Emergency Response Units) are dispatched to the affected area and undertake activities such as setting up aid stations, administering medical diagnosis, and providing psychosocial care.

**Stockpiling and Distribution of Relief Supplies**

On a regular basis the JRC keeps emergency stores of blankets (approximately 200,000 nationwide), sleeping kits (mats, eye masks, etc., which can be used in evacuation centres to help victims get a better sleep, approximately 30,000 sets), and emergency relief kits (approximately 80,000 sets that contain daily necessities which can be useful in times of emergency).

**Provision of Blood Products**

In order to smoothly secure and provide blood products required by medical institutions nationwide in times of emergency, the JRC maintains a stock of products at each blood centre while also operating a system to regulate blood supplies throughout the country.

**Collection of Donations**

The JRC accepts donations for disaster victims and distributes them through donation distribution committees organized by charity organizations and government agencies in the affected areas.
Disaster Volunteer Activities

Disaster volunteers of the JRC receive training on a regular basis and perform a variety of services during an emergency. The operations include gathering information, administering first-aid, preparing hot meals, tracing, transporting and distributing relief supplies, and supporting victims at evacuation centres.

6.2.2 Japan Platform (JPF)

Japan Platform (JPF) is an international emergency humanitarian aid organization which offers more effective and prompter emergency aid, in response to the world situation, focusing the issues of refugees and natural disaster. JPF conducts such aid with a tripartite cooperation system where NGOs, business community, and government of Japan work in close cooperation, based on equal partnership, making the most of the respective sectors’ characteristics and resources.

The revenue source of this “PLATFORM-foundation” is composed of public and private funding: government fund-raising as well as donations from business community and citizens. Therefore, NGOs are able to get expenditures for initial response to implement emergency aid, immediately and directly, from the foundation, and go to the site promptly to start the aid activities timely.

As for business community, “Nippon Keidanren-Japan Business Federation” has initiated to support JPF. This support will be expected to actualize the respective member companies’ participatory contribution through offering their technology, equipment, staff, and information. Also, in order to enhance the transparency and accountability of JPF, we invite media, private foundations, and academic society for their participation and cooperation. We aim to build a system to cope with international emergency aid together with all the parties concerned. That, we believe, is our challenge to facilitate the development of Japanese civil society in the 21st century.

6.2.3 Japan NGO Center For International Cooperation (JANIC)

JANIC is a non-profit, non-partisan networking NGO founded in 1987 by a group of NGO leaders who saw the need to better coordinate activities in Japanese society and facilitate communication with groups overseas. JANIC’s mission are

- To promote networking and collaborative activities among citizens’ organizations (NGOs) engaged in international cooperation.
- To facilitate collective action by its members and wider Japanese civil society to influence the policies and practice of governments and institutions at domestic and international levels.
- To strengthen the institutional capability of NGOs in carrying out their missions.
• To disseminate information and knowledge concerning people's living conditions in developing regions of the world and the impact of the public's way of life on these people.
• To enlighten the general public on the role of NGOs and encourage them to participate in NGO activities in any form.

At present, JANIC has 96 NGO members and is governed by a Board of Trustees, with a secretary general and 33 staff members.

6.2.4 JICA

JICA's Disaster Relief Program dispatches Japan Disaster Relief (JDR) teams and provides emergency relief supplies when major disasters occur, mainly in developing areas, in response to requests received from the governments of affected countries or international agencies. A partial revision of the Japan International Cooperation Agency Law, which involves the addition of emergency relief supplies, led to the establishment of Japan's comprehensive emergency disaster relief system. The JDR Law was partially amended in June 1992, making it possible for the Minister for Foreign Affairs, after consultations with the director-general of the Defense Agency, to send teams from the Japanese Self-Defense Forces when large-scale aid is required in the wake of a large-scale disaster and self-sufficient activities are required in the disaster area.

JDR Activities, as personnel assistance, JICA's Disaster Relief Program dispatches rescue teams, medical teams, and expert teams and provides emergency supplies as material assistance.

The provision of materials includes emergency relief supplies, such as blankets, tents, water purifiers, generators, and pharmaceutical products to assist in the recovery process.

JICA also cooperates with Japanese NGOs operating in affected areas in order to implement more effective operations.

6.2.5 The Councils of Social Welfare

➢ Role and Function of the Councils of Social Welfare

The Councils of Social Welfare is private organizations that promote community welfare, giving high priority to public interests.

Not only welfare and health services but also connections with neighbors and friends are essential for elderly persons, disabled persons, and other people in need of support to continue to live in the communities where they have lived so long. It is hard for them to continue to live in the communities without community people's intention to support them as members of their communities and their actual support. It can be said that community welfare is a system whereby specialists and community people can jointly
support people in need of support.

In addition, the Social Welfare Act provides that a municipality may have only one Council of Social Welfare and that a Council of Social Welfare shall consist of (1) persons engaged in social welfare and (2) residents and volunteers. As an organization whereby persons engaged in social welfare and residents jointly carry out activities, each Council of Social Welfare represents the community and gives high priority to public interests.

Network of the Councils of Social Welfare

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Japan National Council of Social Welfare</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prefectural Councils of Social Welfare</td>
<td>47</td>
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<tr>
<td>Municipal Councils of Social Welfare</td>
<td>1,782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet-Order Designated City Councils of Social Welfare</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ward Councils of Social Welfare</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard services provided by the Municipal Councils of Social Welfare

The Social Welfare Act only shows an outline of the Councils of Social Welfare. There are only a limited number of “services to be performed.” Therefore, each Council of Social Welfare has been providing various services according to the local characteristics and circumstances.

However, there is a basic framework, in which services have been roughly classified into the following four sections:

1. **Community welfare activities promotion section**: This section researches and analyzes various welfare issues arising in the community, promotes systematic and planned efforts to solve the issues in cooperation with the residents, volunteers, and various organizations and agencies and, if necessary, create community welfare services.

2. **Welfare service use support section**: To support elderly and disabled persons, this section promotes the support for the use of welfare services and the support for life through general counseling, lending of funds, procedural agency, provision of information, etc.

3. **Home welfare service section**: This section carries out services under the long-term care insurance system and the assistance benefit supply system and manages home welfare services commissioned by the municipality under laws and contracts.
In addition to them, **the corporate management section** was newly established to administer the corporation properly, to manage the services efficiently and to plan and coordinate affairs concerning the overall organization, such as financial and personnel affairs. Below, the services of each Council of Social Welfare in line with the above-described classification into the three sections.

- **Services provided by the community welfare activities promotion section**

  The section elicits interest in welfare (activities) from the community people, encourages them to participate in welfare activities, coordinates needs with activities, adjusts and coordinates activities, and supports the creation of activities. The section is characterized by provision of support to both territorially-bonded organizations (autonomous neighborhood associations and residents' associations for promotion of community welfare) and volunteer and civil activities carried out in a little wider area, such as at the municipal level.

  The following are examples of services provided by the section Watching and support network: Three to four volunteers (mainly neighbors) watch, visit, and support an elderly or disabled person. If there are problems that cannot be solved only by the volunteers, they are sent to specialized organizations. The network also connects elderly and disabled persons tending to be isolated with the community without fail. The operation of the network requires acquisition of approval from each elderly or disabled person. In many cases, those who do not give approval have serious problems. In such cases, it is important to watch them gently. This network system has been adopted by 46.4% of the Councils of Social Welfare in Japan.

  Friendly and lively salons: These are places where users and volunteers can spend happy time together. Unlike day service centers, salons have a more relaxed atmosphere and users can freely visit them at any time. Many Councils of Social Welfare hold a salon once a month or once a week. Some Councils of Social Welfare hold it every day. There are various salons: those for the elderly, the intellectual disabled, the mentally disabled, and childrearing families. Salons for childrearing families are sometimes called "childrearing salons." This salon system has been adopted by 71.8% of the Councils of Social Welfare in Japan. There are about 40,000 salons in Japan.

  Meal service: Volunteers provide meals through delivery or gathering. Meals are prepared by volunteers or professionals. Provision of high-quality meals enables elderly and disabled persons to have sufficient nutrition. In addition, volunteers can talk with them and check their health conditions. It is important for volunteers to make them eat as pleasantly as possible (many elderly persons do not eat properly). This service has been
provided by 68.7% of the Councils of Social Welfare in Japan. The total number of meals is 1.4 million.

Counseling office (by residents): In areas where activities are briskly carried out based on the above-described services, residents themselves manage counseling offices. Volunteers flexibly satisfy the needs that cannot be satisfied by government programs (whenever necessary, counseling offices seek advice from the Councils of Social Welfare or specialists).

7. Receiving International Humanitarian Assistance in Domestic Disaster

One lesson that had been learned from the 1995 Kobe earthquake is the need to accept the help of other countries. One of the outstanding characteristics of the 1995 earthquake was the extreme reluctance of the Japanese government to accept aid from abroad.

Within a month of the earthquake and tsunami, Japan had received offers of assistance from at least 138 countries and 39 international organizations and 670 NGO's, and on the 11th April the Prime Minister’s office published a letter thanking the global community for their support and friendship, which was published in every major newspaper in the world.

The Government says the need for further international assistance is limited and any support should clearly be in accordance with the Government of Japan's criteria:

With regard to relief items, the Government of Japan has received offers for relief goods/material from many countries, and international organizations. The Government is identifying the needs and trying to match the offers with the identified needs for efficient and effective delivery. As the transportation and storage capacity is still limited, it is strongly recommended not to send any relief goods without coordination with the Government or the local authorities.

1) International Humanitarian Assistance in Domestic Disaster (IHA)
offered in the GEJE (GEJE)

“Establishment of IHA Coordinating Group in March 11th, 2011 22:00”
Assistance offered: 197 countries/institutions
Assistance received: 138 countries/institutions
- USAR: 26 countries
- Medical Team: 4 countries
- Non-food items: 108 countries/institutions
- NGO/NPO : N/A

2) Characteristic on International Humanitarian Assistance (IHA) for Disaster

1.1 Immediate & massive inflow of resource.
   - Different type of resources: goods, funds, people.
   - Different organizations: UN, GO, INGO/GO, Private sector.

1.2 Lack of Governance of local government

3) IHA Reception System in Japan

The Great Hanshin – Awaji Earthquake (1995)
Assistances offered from 76 institution/countries
Received assistances from 44 institutions/countries

Disaster Management Plan (1996)
- MOFA <-> GO. Crisis Management Center decides whether to receive.
- Disaster Management Plan of National Government and Local Government should include article related to receiving international assistance

4) Areas of assistance and Ministries in Charge

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas of Assistance</th>
<th>Assigned Ministry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Search &amp; Rescue</td>
<td>Police Agency, Fire Dept., Min. of Agriculture (Quarantine), Min. of Justice (Custum)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>Min. of Health and Labor, Min. of Justice (Custum)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>Min. of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portable Water</td>
<td>Min. of Health and Labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-food Items</td>
<td>Min. of Economy and Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donations</td>
<td>Cabinet office</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Areas of assistance and Ministries in Charge
5) Reception System of IHA in Japan


Disaster Management Head Quarter
March 11th 15:14 based on Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act
Director General: Prime Minister
Vice Director: Minister On Disaster Prevention
Member: Ministers

On-site Disaster Management Head Quarter (Miyagi Prefecture)
March 12th 6:00
Director: Vice Minister of Cabinet Office
Deputy Direct.
Secretariat General:
Deputy Secretariat
7) Coordination for International SAR Team
-coordinated by Fire Department-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prefecture</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>arrival</th>
<th>departure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>16/3/2011</td>
<td>18/3/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>14/3/2011</td>
<td>21/3/2011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Remark: Started SAR 13/3/2011

Table 4. Coordination for International SAR Team
(Source: Mayumi Sakamoto)

8) Coordination for Receiving ISAR
9) On-site coordination
   • Area coordination
   • Information collection & sharing
     • On-site joint coordination center
     • Coordination meeting
   • conditions
     • self complete
     • respect Japanese traditions

10) Conditions to Receive Assistance
   • To be self complete
     - All domestic transportations, fuels, hotels, foods, interpreters should be covered by assisting countries.
   • To be under on-site command
   • To respect Japanese tradition
     Liaison officers by MOFA & embassy

11) Success of receiving ISAR Team
    (receiving assistance)
   • Integrated into Japanese Emergency Fire Assistance Team
   • Asked collaboration of Command Team of Fire Department.
   • International Command Team was familiar with ISAR (IRT registered teams, JICA Training exper.)

    (Providing assistance)
   • International Standard for SAR
     - Capacity Development though INSARAG
     - Evaluation of SAR by IEC (heavy/middle/light)
12) Assistance Coordination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas of Assistance</th>
<th>Plan</th>
<th>The GEJE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assigned Ministry</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search &amp; Rescue</td>
<td>Police Agency, Fire Dept, Min. of Agriculture (Quarantine)</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Min. of Health and Labor, Min. of Justice (Custum)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>Min. of Agriculture</td>
<td>Cabinet Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portable Water</td>
<td>Min. of Health and Labor, Min. of Justice (Custum)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-food Items</td>
<td>Min. of Economy and Industry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donations</td>
<td>Cabinet Office</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO/NPO/Volunteer</td>
<td>Volunteer Center/NGO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. Assistance Coordination
(Source: Mayumi Sakamoto)

8. Disaster Relief Material Management in the Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE)

8.1 Classifications of relief materials is divided into emergency material and donated material. Term: Definition.

1. Relief material: Food and daily commodities provided to affected people at disaster time.

2. Emergency material: stockpile or procured material provided by local
government to affected people who cannot procure necessary materials for daily life by themselves at disaster time.

3. Stockpiles: daily commodities such as food, drinking water and blankets stockpiled by resident and local government in preparation for disaster

4. Procured material: Material that affected local government requests and procures from central government, other local governments and private companies. This includes material with or without agreement on material procurement before disaster. Also this includes material procured with or without payment.

5. Donated material: material voluntarily donated by resident inside or outside affected area, private companies and organizations without request from affected local government at disaster time.

6. Public stockpile: stockpile of material that local government prepares by itself in preparation for disaster

7. Distribution stockpile: material procurement system where local government makes agreement with private companies on necessary items for disaster time.

8.2 Self help, mutual help and public help

Material procurement at disaster time is classified as self help, mutual help and public help FDMA (2007) says “Self help by resident is fundamental”. When material procurement by self help is limited, local government procures materials and provides residents with them as emergency materials. As prescribed in Article 4 and 5 of Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act, local government has responsibility to protect life and health against disasters. No doubt that in GEJE where sufficient material procurement by self help and mutual help was impossible, public help by central, prefectural and municipal governments played a critical role.

8.3 Overview of relief material management

This survey generally defines a series of process of material procurement, transportation to affected area, receiving, distributing, and storing at stockyard, sending from stockyard, delivering to evacuation center as “relief material management”.

Once needs of evacuation center are identified by municipalities, order or request of materials are made directly by the municipalities or providers such as non-affected local government, private sector or individual via prefecture or central government. Order or request to provider is finally made by municipality, prefecture or central government. Sometimes donated materials are provided without any request from municipality, prefecture or central government. Thus material procurement can be classified as 4 patterns; 1) procurement by municipality, 2) procurement by prefecture, 3) procurement by central government and 4) donated material.

On the other hand, there are three patterns of transportation of relief materials; 1) delivery to evacuation center via both prefectural stockyard and municipal
stockyard, 2) delivery to evacuation center via municipal stockyard only, and 3) direct delivery to evacuation center without passing through prefectoral or municipal stockyard. Combination of four procurement types and three patterns of transportation makes twelve patterns in total. Excluding non-existing patterns such as central government procurement directly delivered to evacuation center, there are nine patterns of material procurement and transportation. As food has freshness date and expiration date, when food is procured by municipality, food can be transported to evacuation center without passing through municipal stockyard (pattern 2). In case of procurement by prefecture, material can be delivered to municipal stockyard or evacuation center without passing through prefectural stockyard (pattern 4 and 5). Also this applies when time passes after the earthquake and the number of evacuation center declines.

Means of transportation is prepared by material provider in principle. When prefecture and municipality procures material, material provider arranges transportation means to prefectoral or municipal stockyard and evacuation center. On the other hand, regarding to material provided by central government or donated material coordinated by central government, trucks procured by central government and aircrafts and vessels of Self Defense Force transported a large amount of materials at the Great East Japan Earthquake. In case of transportation from prefectoral stockyard to municipal stockyard, truck association in each prefecture delivered almost all transportation. Transportation from municipal stockyard to evacuation center varies depending on municipalities and timing; case 1) transportation by official vehicle or their own vehicles, case 2) by vehicles of Self Defense Force and case 3) by private distributors commissioned by municipality.

Source : Revised from Fire and Disaster Management Agency (2007)

8.4 Role of central government in relief material management

In the Great East Japan Earthquake, while roles of central government, prefecture and municipality were quite different in accordance with degree of impacts. Roles of prefectures and municipalities are mentioned. The following are two major roles that central government played. One is material procurement/transport coordination in Emergency Disaster Headquarters (special headquarters) set up for about forty days from 11 March to 20 April. The other is a consolidated transport scheme by Self Defense Force about relief materials from local government and private sector which was announced on 16 March.

Immediately after the earthquake on 11 March, transport coordination team and material coordination team were set up in administrative operation group (Group C) in Emergency Disaster Headquarters with a total of 15 and 22 officials respectively. As special headquarters on life support of affected people were set up on 20 March, they were reorganized as transport and communications team and material coordination team with a total of 17 and 27 officials respectively. Utilizing materials provided by companies for free
and 30.2 billion yen for FY2012 reserve, food equivalent to 26.21 million meals, 7.94 bottles of beverage, daily commodities like toilet paper, blanket, diaper, proprietary drug and mask were procured and transported to affected areas, basically prefectural stockyard. For transportation, about 1,900 trucks arranged by Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transportation and Tourism and Japan Trucking Association, 150 aircrafts of Air Self Defense Force, 5 helicopters from police and private sector, 8 vessels. Maximum delivery amount per day is 1.13 million meals. Regarding material procurement and transportation coordination, please refer to Cabinet Office (2011) in charge of Disaster.

The other role by central government is consolidated transport scheme by Self Defense Force. Self Defense Force, in collaboration with group of governors, established reception counter at prefectural government offices, transporting donated materials brought at Ground Self Defense Force camps at each prefecture to affected areas. Aircrafts transported about 1,000 tons of materials to Fukushima, Matsushima and Hanamaki airports by May. Most of materials transported by the aircrafts were sent to prefectural stockyard. On the other hand, trucks transported about 1,150 materials by September. It is said that consolidated transport scheme by Self Defense Force helped reduce burden of Emergency Disaster Headquarters in material procurement and transport coordination. However, this might have worsened material pileup in prefectural and municipal stockyard though transport bases of Self Defense Force did not have material pileup. In the beginning of the scheme, reception counter at prefecture meant to transport materials provided by prefecture, municipality, and private sector excluding individual. But as prefectures and municipalities had accepted relief materials from individuals and groups, a large amount of materials were delivered to affected areas with no specification on boxes or boxes containing multiple types of items. As a result, material beyond capacity of prefectures and municipalities accumulated, accelerating suspension of accepting at prefectural and municipal stockyards. Also, since prefecture stopped accepting materials, some donated materials lost destination and delivered in nearly six months after the quake. By the way, Self Defense Force transported about 1,800 tons by air and about 700 tons by under material procurement and transport coordination operation by the above-mentioned Emergency Disaster Headquarters (special headquarters) in addition to the consolidated transport scheme.

8.5 Logistics Chain Management for Emergency Supplies

In response to the Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE) disaster, relief goods were distributed and delivered through prefectural- and municipal-level depots. This delivery system faced several problems including fuel shortages, interruption of
telecommunication services, and supply and demand mismatches, resulting in stockpiling of
the goods in depots and delayed delivery to the people in need. Several measures can be
taken to address these issues, including prior surveys of depot facilities, estimating in
advance the quantities of emergency goods that will be required, enlisting the support of
professional logistics specialists, and promoting logistics information management in
unaffected areas, among others.

The damage from the earthquake and tsunami was enormous; over 120,000
houses were totally damaged, and more than 470,000 people had to leave their home and
evacuate to over 2,400 shelters. Delivery of relief goods was planned to be executed
through depots at two levels—prefectural and municipal. Especially in the first two weeks,
fuel shortages made downstream deliveries from prefectural depots very difficult. Also,
manpower shortages and the inconvenient building specifications of depots were the main
causes of unnecessary stockpiling in depots. Telecommunications disruptions furthered
mismatches between real needs and supplies. But the professional support of logistics
specialists was effective in relieving the bottlenecks in depots.

The relief goods delivery system in Japan

In Japan delivery of relief goods is the responsibility of the prefectural
governor, who responds to requests from the municipalities. According to the post disaster
plan, delivery of relief goods was to be executed using depots at two levels: prefectural and
municipal, as shown in figure 1. As illustrated in green in the figure, the national government
Figure 16. Information and transportation flows in the official relief goods delivery system
(Source: Makato Okumura)

(cabinet office) was also included in the plan to facilitate nationwide distribution. By April 20, the national goods distribution component had mobilized 26 million meals, 8 million bottles of beverages, and 410,000 blankets using 1,900 trucks, 150 aircraft, 5 helicopters, and 8 ships.

Delivering several kinds of goods, such as food, drinking water, clothing, and bedding, either to people’s homes or to more than 2,000 shelters, was a challenge, especially in the first several weeks when fuel was in short supply. This was especially true for the smaller local transport companies that did not have their own storage facilities. By the end of June, 1,800, 1,400, and 2,400 trucks were dedicated to transporting goods from prefectural depots to municipal depots in Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima, respectively. Fuel shortages combined with power outages and telecommunications failures hampered local government efforts to meet emergency needs.

Although many believe that transportation problems were the critical factor, several other forces were at play. The workload spiked at the same time that many staff were being lost to the disaster. Moreover, while the disaster countermeasure manuals state
that the economic or industrial support branch of the local government is responsible for the delivery system, workers in that section did not have enough knowledge or experience with logistics and supply chain management. They simply stored the goods in public buildings, with no logistics management plan, so the space was quickly.

The building specifications and design of the depots was also a contributing factor. The depots require large storage and handling capacity as well as easy access to expressways, especially prefectural depots. Privately owned warehouses would have been ideal if they had not been damaged. The space under viewing stands in athletic fields, race courses, and indoor gymnasia also served well as depots. In Miyagi Prefecture, large warehouses located near Sendai Port were severely damaged by the tsunami.

Neither Yume Messe Miyagi, the convention complex at Sendai Port, nor the Miyagi Prefectural Sports Park could be used as depots since they had already been designated as mortuaries.

9. Problems and Causes of Relief Material Management in the Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE)

Table summarize problems and causes of relief material management in the Great East Japan Earthquake

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>Cause</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Distribution to affected people</td>
<td>1.1 Length of time to distribute minimum food and drinking water</td>
<td>- Lack of absolute amount of stockpile - Malfunction of distribution stockpile system - Difficulties of assessment of evacuation center by municipality due to damaged government building, information shutdown and fuel shortage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Difficulties of situation assessment in affected areas due to information shutdown - Inequality of amount of material among affected municipalities. - Difference of community's support among affected municipalities - Declining of transportation capacity in affected areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.2 Lack of</td>
<td>- Loss of vehicles by tsunami</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage</td>
<td>Problem</td>
<td>Cause</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1.3 Material distribution to evacuees at home | - Shortage of manpower  
- Shortage of fuel  
- Disconnection of roads by debris  
- Ineffective utilization of distribution companies | |
| 1.4 Material distribution to cross-boundary evacuees | - Long-term paralysis of commercial distribution  
- Difficulties in situation assessment of evacuees at home  
- Lack of recognition by municipalities | |
| 1.5 Time lag in material distribution | - Defect in distribution rule to cross-boundary evacuees  
- Difficulties in situation assessment of cross-boundary evacuees | |
| 1.6 Difficulties in coping with change in needs | - Inconsistent standards and amount of materials  
- Consideration in equality among evacuees | |
| 2. Storage of materials | 2.1 Difficulties in finding stockyards | - Lack of expectation in advance  
- Loss by tsunami and impacts from blackout  
- Use of facility in different purpose from plan |
| 2.2 Lack of capacity and function of stockyard | - Use of facility in different purpose from plan  
- Large amount of relief material  
- Extreme excessive material | |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>Cause</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Heavy burden on</td>
<td>- Confusion by large scale disaster beyond expectation</td>
<td>- Decline in local governance by affected government office and officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>officials</td>
<td>- Decline in local governance by affected government office and officials</td>
<td>- Large amount of relief material beyond capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Unfamiliar relief material operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Lack of information in transportation and arrival status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Donated material with insufficient information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Distributing chores of materials containing mixed items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Ineffective utilization of distribution companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 Ineffective utilization</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Lack of understanding of Disaster Relief Law by municipalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of distribution companies</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Affected distribution companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 Difficulties in</td>
<td>- A large number of various donated materials</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inventory management</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Donated material with insufficient information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Donated material containing mixed items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Changes in needs according to the lapse of time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6 A large number of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>excessive materials</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Donated materials without prior coordination with municipality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Donated materials that do not match with needs of affected people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Donated material with insufficient information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Donated materials containing mixed items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Impact of media reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7 Distribution of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>donated materials containing</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Lack of recognition of supporters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mixed items</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Lack of public relations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 3. Material procurement | 3.1 Malfunction of distribution stock system | - Paralysis of commercial distribution  
- Damage by tsunami |
|-------------------------|--------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 3.2 Shortage of stockpile | - Large scale of impact beyond expectation  
- Loss by tsunami |
| 3.3 Malfunction of mutual support system at disaster time | - Damages incurred to municipalities that have mutual agreement  
- Information shutdown |
| 3.4 Difficulties in making procurement request to prefecture from municipality | - Decline in municipality’s function  
- Confusion in situation assessment of evacuation center  
- Information shutdown |
| 3.5 Difficulties in needs assessment of affected areas by central government and prefecture | - Information shutdown  
- Ineffective material procurement system |
| 4. Material transportation to affected areas | 4.1 Confusion in truck transportation | - Lack of fuel  
- Insufficient road information  
- Insufficient information sharing between cargo and recipient  
- Information shutdown  
- Issuance of emergency vehicle pass |
| 4.2 Confusion in truck transportation in Fukushima | - Impact by Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Reactor |
| 4.3 Decline in vessel transportation | - Damage to port |

Table 6. Problems and Causes of Relief Material Management in The GEJE.

10. CONCLUSION
One lesson that had been learnt from the 1995 Kobe earthquake is the need to accept the help of other countries. One of the distinctive characteristics of the 1995 earthquake was the extreme reluctance of the Japanese government to accept aid from abroad. Experience in receiving goods during the Great Hanshin Earthquake, Hyogo prefecture by Kobe city receive donations directly from the people and donation by mailing at post office without charge made a lot of donation goods at the hub of receive donation goods (The social welfare council). In the management of donation goods, Kobe city select the evacuation centers are managed and distributed. At that time, management by city and municipality many people from nationwide interested in donating a lot making difficult to management. Especially, made a burden on the staff to select, storage and distribution. Furthermore, local government did not explore the needs of victim people at first.

For this reason, made Japan government decide to receive donations in the form of money than goods because there is more flexibility and easy to manage the funds. In addition, Japan government get donated specifically such as selected donated water from a large company including transportation to disaster area in Tohoku. Besides, Japan government prepare stockpiling in the prefectures at bases around Japan to help people immediately when has disaster and when disaster in large scale occurred in aboard can use this stockpiling to help people by government of Japan as well.

I. Plan for Relief

1. Japan has Disaster Relief Act to provide emergency relief in the event of a disaster through the local governments, non-governmental organizations, such as the Japanese Red Cross Society, and the general public, so as to protect the disaster victims and maintain social order.

2. The Basic Disaster Management Plan of the country defines procedures for accepting and facilitating international disaster relief goods and it states that the government should prepare procedure necessary to accept and facilitate international relief when an offer for relief is reached from aboard. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should notify the Government Disaster Management Headquarters of its type, expected, arrival date and destination. The government Headquarters should determine whether to accept the offer and a plan for facilitating the relief according to the pre-defined policy and notify the offering country as well as related ministries and local governments.
3. When a large-scale disaster strikes, an emergency team composed of the Director Generals of the respective ministries and agencies gathers immediately at the Crisis Management Center in the Prime Minister's Office to grasp and analyze the disaster situation, and report the results to the Prime Minister. Inter-ministerial meetings at the ministerial or high-ranking senior-official level are held to decide basic response policies if necessary. According to the level of damage, the government may establish a Headquarter for Major Disaster Management (headed by the Minister of State for Disaster Management) or a Headquarters for Extreme Disaster Management (headed by the Prime Minister). Additionally, a government investigation team headed by the Minister of State for Disaster Management may be dispatched, or an onsite response headquarters may be established.

4. The roles of Municipal, Prefectural and Central Government - Municipal governments have the primary responsibility in disaster emergency response. When a disaster is of large scale and is under Disaster Relief Act, prefecture conducts disaster relief activities. Materials are purchased from private companies within the prefecture and procured from other prefectures under regional support system. Disaster Relief Act stipulates prefecture has primary responsibility to conduct disaster relief while it is approved to partially charge municipalities with authorities of disaster relief. Thus prefecture and municipality share responsibilities of their roles in fact. As stipulated in Basic Disaster Prevention Plan, when a disaster is large scale and beyond prefecture’s capacity, affected local government makes request of material procurement to relevant ministries.

II. Disaster Emergency Response Management.

5. Government Disaster Management Headquarter sets up international coordination team to review offer of international relief and coordination with related ministries for facilitating the relief work, once an offer is accepted. The Team comprises of supervisory staff and 16 members.
6. The Government Headquarter facilitates distribution of relief goods offered by foreign governments by studying and developing local needs from affected municipalities and matching them with the offers. The headquarters also supports domestic transport and interim storage.

7. The Government of Japan received 138 offers of assistance from countries as well as 39 offers from international organizations. It accepted relief items from 29 countries and international organizations.

8. **Japan Red Cross Society (JRC)** - Disaster relief activities are conducted as a mission of the Red Cross under the Japanese Red Cross Law and its statutes. In addition, the JRC is designated as a “Designated Public Corporation” by the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act and the Disaster Relief Act, and is required to co-operate with the Government to offer relief assistance in times of disaster. The contents of such assistance are provided for under an agreement with the Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare.

9. **The domestic disaster relief activities of the JRC** – Involvement of JRC in relief goods includes storage and distribution of relief goods and collection and distribution of voluntary donations. Activities by Red Cross volunteers include collection of information, first aid, provision of hot meals, tracing services, transportation and distribution of relief goods, and caring for those who evacuate to shelters.

10. **JICA** - JICA’s Response to Great East Japan Earthquake are relief activities by JICA staff and Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers (JOCVs) in disaster affected areas, shelter for the people evacuated, accommodation for the patients from disaster affected areas, liaison services for international agencies and overseas medical teams, UNDAC/UNOCHA teams and JICA provided various support to the teams, collaboration with NGO/NPO, Japan Platform (JPF) and Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC) and local NGO/NPO networks for the coordination of relief and recovery activities.
III. Volunteer Coordination.

11. The Government of Japan’s Emergency Management agencies lead the response through the Emergency Response Team. The Chief Cabinet Secretary’s Office is responsible for coordinating volunteer groups and NGOs through its Volunteers Coordination Unit to facilitate the communication and exchange of information among the organizations working in Tohoku area to support the survivors. Coordination of international NGOs and their local partners was done by Japan Platform and JANIC.

IV. International Non-Governmental Organization Coordination (INGO) and Private companies.

12. In coordination with the government, Japan Platform (an international emergency humanitarian aid organization) and the Japan Non-Governmental Organization Center for International Cooperation (acting as part of the Japan Civil Network for Disaster Relief in East Asia) served as the key organizations coordinating with international non-governmental organizations.

13. Some international organisations and private companies offered domestic transport to some of the foreign relief goods for free of charge. Other companies also provided a warehouse at Narita Airport and the management of the warehouse for free.

V. Self Help, Mutual Help and Public Help.

14. Japan has material procurement at disaster time is classified as self help, mutual help and public help. FDMA (2007) says “Self help by resident is fundamental. When material procurement by self help is limited, local government procures materials and provides residents with them as emergency materials. As prescribed in Article 4 and 5 of Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act, local government has responsibility to protect life and health against disasters. In the GEJE where sufficient material procurement by self help and mutual help was impossible, public help by central, prefectural and municipal governments played a critical role.
15. Japanese government promote Japanese people for helping themselves by “Self help” before others help such as preparing goods at least three days during initial disaster before help from government or private sector comes. The important of “Self help”, or protecting one’s own life, and “mutual-assistance,” in which neighbors help each other to protect their communities, invaluable in the event of disaster, was one again strongly reconfirmed during the Great East Japan Earthquake. In addition, it need not be mentioned that “public-assistance” – the role of the government authorities in preparing for disaster in normal times and their activities at the time of disaster, such as the search and rescue of resident - is also essential. It will be necessary to strengthen the disaster response capabilities or the various parties concerned with Self-help, mutual-assistance, and public-assistance.

16. Japan is now paying more attention to self-help a lot. Including, mutual assistance”. The community is educated and motivated to prepared for safe evacuation, prepare emergency bags containing necessary food and water for the initial period of emergency, etc. In particular, the focus is on self-reliance.

VI. Civil Society.

17. The Councils of Social Welfare- The Councils of Social Welfare is promoting community welfare, giving high priority to public interests and health services and also connecting with neighbors and friends for elderly persons, disabled persons, and other people in need of support to continue to live in the communities. Community welfare is a system whereby specialists and community people can jointly support people in need of support.
11. Appendix

**Thailand Floods 2011**

**Overview situation**

For the flooding which involved southern Thailand in March–April 2011, see 2011 Southern Thailand floods. Severe flooding occurred during the 2011 monsoon season in Thailand. Beginning at the end of July triggered by the landfall of Tropical Storm Nock-ten, flooding soon spread through the provinces of Northern, Northeastern and Central Thailand along the Mekong and Chao Phraya river basins. In October floodwaters reached the mouth of the Chao Phraya and inundated parts of the capital city of Bangkok. Flooding persisted in some areas until mid-January 2012, and resulted in a total of 815 deaths (with 3 missing) and 13.6 million people affected. Sixty-five of Thailand's 77 provinces were declared flood disaster zones, and over 20,000 square kilometres (7,700 sq mi) of farmland was damaged. The disaster has been described as "the worst flooding yet in terms of the amount of water and people affected."

The World Bank has estimated 1,425 billion baht (US$45.7 Bn) in economic damages and losses due to flooding, as of 1 December 2011. Most of this was to the manufacturing industry, as seven major industrial estates were inundated by as much as 3 meters (10 feet) during the floods. Disruptions to manufacturing supply chains affected regional automobile production and caused a global shortage of hard disk drives which lasted throughout 2012.

The World Bank's estimate for this disaster means it ranks as the world's fourth costliest disaster as of 2011, surpassed only by the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan, 1995 Kobe earthquake, and Hurricane Katrina in 2005.

Thailand's southern provinces also saw seasonal flash-flooding towards the end of the year, although these did not occur in the same extreme nature as in the more northern provinces.

*Picture 2. Thailand Floods 2011*
Comparison between tracking system and management of donated goods in the Great East JAPAN earthquake (GEJE) 2011, Japan and Thailand Flood 2011.

| The Great East JAPAN Earthquake (GEJE) 2011 | Thailand Flood 2011 |

1) **Administration**

**A. In Basic Disaster Management Plan (1995) of Japan, there is a mention of coordination of international Disaster Relief. The Plan defines procedures to accept and facilitate international disaster relief but there is no system of receiving assistance and donation at prefecture and local government level. The good point during Japanese response during disaster was that the Government Disaster Management Headquarters was established by the Cabinet office.**

**B. Procedure**

Japan established International Humanitarian Assistance (IHA) for Disaster Coordinating during the GEJE to receive international assistance coordinated by MOFA.

**C. Institutional arrangement (Structure) and Management of donated goods**

The Cabinet office is the Government Headquarters when large disaster like the 2011 GEJE occur. The Headquarters.

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1) **Administration**

**A. Thailand provides a very general guideline on roles for accepting international assistance in the National Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan and plan also has article related to receiving assistance and donation in provincial and local government. But when Thailand was flooded in 2011 the plan to manage the flood disaster was not put into action and instead Thai Government at that time established FROC (Flood Relief Operation Centre). This created confusion in the minds of all stakeholders via their role.**

**B. Procedure**

The Thai government does not officially request aid from international community, but aid is accepted by Foreign Assistance Coordination Centre, Ministry of Foreign Affairs through the coordinating center. It facilitates import of relief material through customs.

**C. Institutional arrangement (Structure) and Management of donated goods.**

Thailand does not have such a strong institutional mechanism in place as in Japan. Moreover, the mechanism
responds and manages disaster through working group and assign duties to the agency which is responsible

2) **Needs Assessment**

- Both Japan and Thailand used the same mechanism in needs assessment whether counting of affected people, assessment of affected people’s needs, distribution of materials to affected people by local governance.
  - The Government Headquarters facilitated distribution of relief goods offered by foreign governments by studying and developing local needs from affected municipalities and matching them with the offers.

3) **Tracking system**

Japanese people are taught to cope up with disasters by preparing themselves to sustain life for at least 3 days and according to Central Disaster Management Council (2007), the country should prepare materials as regional procurement. In addition, about tracking system, the delivery of relief goods is the responsibility

prescribed in the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan is not put in place when the disaster strikes as is the case in 2011 floods. The Thai Govt. established the Flood Relief Operation Center (FROC), to respondent to flood and receive and distribute relief material.

2) **Needs Assessment**

- Thailand explored needs assessment primarily by assisting the local government agencies and Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) and rendered help in the initial distribution. This includes assisting with the donation by the donor.

3) **Tracking system**

In Thailand, the FROC was the hub to get donations as well as to store, sort out and transport the relief goods. The delivery of relief goods to the disaster area was provided through vehicles almost arranged by government and the military.
of the prefectural governor which the Government Headquarters facilitated and supported domestic transport and interim storage as necessary. Also some relief material used was a purchased product from companies with auto transport by the transportation into the area which this mechanism can adaptation in another country.

4) Collaboration with partners

A. NGO/INGO/Volunteer

Japan has central agency to coordinate assistance to the NGO such as JANIC and Japanese Red Cross. The Chief Cabinet Secretary’s Office is responsible for coordinating volunteer groups and NGOs through its Volunteers Coordination Unit in order to facilitate the communication and exchange of information among the organizations working in Tohoku area to support The survivors and coordination of international NGOs and their local partners.

B. Civil Society

In case of disaster, civil society in Japan is quite strong. There are Social Welfare Councils in a nationwide set up with volunteer centers in the affected municipalities. It’s making the volunteer

4) Collaboration with partners

A. NGO/INGO/Volunteer

Thailand has no central agency to coordinate the NGO assisting victims with the government like in Japan. However, In the event of disaster, including Thailand flood 2011 found a lot of volunteers to the affected areas without effective management support systems, lack of funding and communication. Volunteers had no direction to do anything or extend any help. Many a times the volunteer may not be prepared for practice and lack of skills needed to help.

B. Civil Society

Thailand doesn’t have a formal organization about civil society like Japan. But has temporary Civil Society organizations responded to Thailand flood 2011 situation.
activities in community are effective and also continue has activity when in normal situation.

**C. Private Sector**

Japan government has pre-existing emergency agreement with private sector so that it can help people and government a lot when in large disaster occurs and cooperation between private sector in Japan can be a model in another country.

**C. Private Sector**

Private sector in Thailand had a little role in Thailand flood because they don’t have emergency agreement between government and private sector like in Japan.

**5) Problems**

- There was a common problem in The GEJE and Thailand flood of large number of excessive materials but there was no system to manage the information on relief supplies.

- In the GEJE, There was no preparation or plan for the management of donated goods in prefecture level and local government level. However at the national level the government headquarters (The cabinet office) tried to solve the problem. But in large scale disaster like this there were many problems that cabinet office could handle. There was one directional communication i.e. only from the top down was not enough. Difficulties were faced in needs assessment of affected areas by central government and prefecture. There was lack of Information, and non-viability of

- Thailand has no formally stated national or set of principles established but has preparation plan all level from national level to provincial level but do not use the plan when Thailand flood 2011 occurred. Thai Government used FROC as the hub to manage everything, receiving the donation, storage, sorting and transport. There was a major problem in the management of non-union. There were many players involved with accepting and distributing goods which causes potential confusion. Politicians had a lot of role in the whole process.
fuel to transport the material to the affected areas.
- There was a lack of transportation capacity in affected areas. Cases of oversupplies of food and medicine in some area while there were cases severe food shortages in others.

1) Administration

A. Plan

Japan

1. The Basic Disaster Management Plan (1995), mentions coordination of international Disaster Relief to define procedures to accept and facilitate international disaster relief. In Chapter 1 Disaster Prevention - The government should prepare procedure necessary to accept and facilitate international relief. In Chapter 2 Emergency Response - When an offer for relief is reached from aboard, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should notify the Government Disaster Management Headquarters of its type, expected, arrival date and destination. The government Headquarters should determine whether to accept the offer. When the government accepts the offer, a plan for facilitating the relief should be prepared according to the pre-defined policy and be notified to the offering country as well as related ministries and local governments.

2. An Inter- Ministerial Agreement was drafted in 1998 to assess concrete area of relief and determine responsible ministries such as for food responsible ministries is Ministry of Agriculture, monetary aid is Cabinet Office, daily essentials are ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry.

4. However the GEJE was large scale and the management was only top down from government and no plan as how to do and to respond in prefecture and local government level. In the prefecture and local government plan, there is no plan mention how to manage donation goods when disaster occurs.

5. In Basic Disaster Management Plan (1995) of Japan, there is mention of coordination of international Disaster Relief to define procedures and to accept and facilitate international disaster relief but doesn’t have plan to mention article related to receiving assistance and donation in prefecture and local government. The good point when Japan response during disaster occurred is that the Government Disaster Management Headquarters was established by the Cabinet office.

**Thailand**

6. Thailand has no formally stated rational or set of principles established for allowing and tracking donated goods. Section 4.2.6 of the National Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan provides very general guidelines on roles for accepting international assistance. Section 6.3.2 mentions that when disaster occurs in any area they should establish the headquarters of the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation particular in that area. The headquarters in the area is divided as structure 8 parts and 1 advisory group. One of the structures which is responsible for receiving donations include the donor center, the allocation of funds and relief materials, the accountants get paid and material donation. Likewise, the provincial and local plans have provision as how to manage donation goods when disaster occurs.

7. One can see that Thailand has Disaster Prevention and Mitigation plans to receive assistance and donation at all level from national level plan, provincial level plan and local government plan. The plan mentions who is responsible for management of donation and where to store, how to manage etc. Despite the country having plans but the same were not implemented as is seen during Thailand Flood in 2011.
8. Thailand provides very general guidelines on roles for accepting international assistance in the National Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan and plan also has article related to receiving assistance and donation in provincial and local government. But when Thailand was flooded in 2011 the plan to manage the flood disaster was not put into action and instead Thai Government at that time established FROC (Flood Relief Operation Centre). This created confusion in the minds of all stakeholders via their role.

B. Procedure

**Japan**

9. Establishment of International Humanitarian Assistance (IHA) for Disaster Coordinating – The IHA center established during the GEJE to receive international assistance was coordinated by MOFA. IHA Reception System in Crisis Management Center decided whether to receive assistance or not. There was immediate & massive inflow of resource. However, there was lack of capacity at local government level. There were conditions to receive assistance such as all domestic transportations, fuels, hotels, foods; interpreters should be covered by assisting countries, and to respect Japanese tradition etc.

**Thailand**

10. The Thai government does not officially request aid from international community, but aid is accepted by Foreign Assistance Coordination Centre, Ministry of Foreign Affairs through the coordinating center. It facilitates import of relief material through customs.

11. Foreign aid received is divided into three parts:

   (i) Many countries support financially either through the Red Cross or through the government itself.

   (ii) Relief supplies such as sandbags, water pumps Medicine punts, etc. were given as relief supplies when sent to Thailand. It was distributed to the agencies involved.

   (iii) Providing technical assistance or technical cooperation. Some countries sent Staff to support FROC (The Flood Relief Operation Center) such as Netherlands which is experienced in the management of water. Two
experts from Netherlands were sent to help the Govt. Moreover, meetings with FEMA - Federal Emergency Management Agency of the United States were held through teleconference to learn from their experience in handling Katrina. Besides, the United States has had send an officer to assess the damage and make recommendations. In the same manner, ASEAN also assessed damages to evaluate situations and make recommendations. Thailand did not request assistance from abroad while Japan has been helped by the lessons learnt from the Kobe earthquake.

C. Institutional arrangement (Structure) and Management of donated goods

**Japan**

12. The Cabinet office is the Government Headquarters when large disaster like the 2011 GEJE occur. The Government Disaster Management Headquarters (The Cabinet office) responds and manages disaster through working group and assign duties to the agency which is responsible for a particular job such as daily essentials is the responsibility of Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and Monetary aid is the responsibility of Cabinet Office. During the 2011 GEJE, Japan had set up the Government Disaster Management Headquarters at Cabinet Office and had 2 teams to facilitate and coordinate SAR Teams.

13. The national government formed a special team to take charge of the logistics for relief supplies.

14. According to the Disaster Relief Act, the JRCS is obligated to cooperate with the national and prefectural governments in the provision of relief assistance. The responsibility during the GEJE such as stockpiling, distribution of relief supplies, collection of donations and disaster volunteer activities was also entrusted to JRCS.

15. Japan Red Cross is the center, which received donation money during the GEJE. The government of Japan chose to receive donation money rather than goods because of the flexibility in management.

16. Disaster Relief Agreements. During the past couple of decades, more and more local governments in Japan have signed disaster relief agreements with one another. A typical agreement involves two localities, located far enough apart so
that both are not affected by the same disaster; and if either party is affected by a disaster, the other is supposed to help. As of April 2010, 1,571, or 89.8 percent of all municipalities, had signed such an agreement, of which 820 signed with a municipality outside their own prefectures. Various kinds of support were provided to the municipalities affected by the GEJE based on these agreements.

**Thailand**

17. Thailand does not have such a strong institutional mechanism in place as in Japan. Moreover, the mechanism prescribed in the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plans is not put in place when the disaster strikes as is the case in 2011 floods.

18. In 2011 Thailand Flood, donated goods were managed by the Flood Relief Operation Center (FROC), which provides support services including a place to get reliefs material donated to the flood victims and shelters.

19. Regulation of the Prime Minister on donations to help the victims of disaster B.E. 2542 (1999), Thailand. Specify a fund established to help the victims of disaster, Office of the Prime Minister to obtain money or property donated to help the victims of disaster for their survival occupational and restoration of living conditions for the better. As well as to any other actions necessary to provide for the public good.

20. During Thailand Flood 2011, the Thai government opening account "fund to help the victims of disaster responsible by The Prime Minister's office to collect funds through public donations fund to help the flood victims who are stronger in the provinces such as funds have costs awarded to the heirs of victims who died, help people who has homes damaged by the disaster, purchase skiffs , and the purchase of consumer goods to DDPM to help victim people .Besides, also support many foundations and Thai Red Cross.

21. The "National Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Act B.E. 2550(2007) provides for "The National Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Committee which is chaired by the Prime Minister. But the National Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Committee is unable to perform their duties effectively. With the establishment of various committee to act as a redundant. Course of make trouble shooting and commissioning confusing and cannot be done on time urgency.
22. After Thailand Flood, Thai government established a new organization responsible for national water resources and flood management named as Project Management Office (PMO) ’s Regulation on National Water Resources and Flood Management B.E. 2555 (2012) and addition addendum of The national Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan, a new chapter about Water and Flood Management.

23. Thailand does not have such a strong institutional mechanism in place as in Japan. Moreover, the mechanism prescribed in the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan is not put in place when the disaster strikes as is the case in 2011 floods. In addition to, established the Flood Relief Operation Center (FROC), which Headquarters responds and manages disaster including a place to get reliefs material donated to the flood victims and shelters.

2) Needs Assessment

Japan

24. The Government Headquarters facilitated distribution of relief goods offered by foreign governments by studying and developing local needs from affected municipalities and matching them with the offers.

25. The municipality has a role to damage assessment, counting of affected people, assessment of affected people’s needs, distribution of materials procured as stockpiles and distribution of stocked materials to affected people, the reception of procured material from central government and prefecture and donated materials and their distribution throughout food distribution.

26. As stipulated in Basic Disaster Prevention Plan, when a disaster is large scale and beyond prefecture’s capacity, affected local government makes request of material procurement to relevant ministries.

Thailand

27. Thailand explored primarily by assisting local government agencies and Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) and rendered help in the initial distribution. This includes assisting with the donation by the donor.
Both Japan and Thailand use the same mechanism in need assessment whether counting of affected people, assessment of affected people’s needs, distribution of materials to affected people by local governance.

3) **Tracking system**

*(Storage/Sorting/Distribution of Goods/Vehicle/Trucking/Shipping)*

**Japan**

29. Japanese people are taught to cope up with disasters by preparing themselves to sustain life for at least 3 days without expecting any help from the Government.

30. According to Central Disaster Management Council (2007), the country should prepare the following materials as regional procurement: food including rice, bread, rice ball, lunch box, instant noodle, powdered milk for baby, canned food, retort pouch food and water in PET bottle; daily necessities including underwear, blanket, working clothes, towel, engine, portable cooking stove and gas cylinder.

31. In the case of Hyogo Prefecture, the materials have stocked in the Hyogo Prefectural Emergency Management and Training Center which can be used to help victims of the disaster in a timely manner. Japan can bring these materials to assist victims in another country to assist in humanitarian settings as well.

32. The Government Headquarters facilitated and supported domestic transport and interim storage as necessary. Since it was difficult to utilize the mass-procurement and mass shipping channels within the Headquarters, the Headquarters’s team directly contacted municipalities and matched their needs with offered goods.

33. The delivery of relief goods is the responsibility of the prefectural governor, who responds to request from the municipalities.
34. There are three patterns of transportation of relief materials; 1) delivery to evacuation center via both prefectural stockyard and municipal stockyard, 2) delivery to evacuation center via municipal stockyard only, and 3) direct delivery to evacuation center without passing through prefectural or municipal stockyard.

35. When prefecture and municipality procures material, material provider arranges transportation means to prefectural or municipal stockyard and evacuation center. On the other hand, regarding material provided by central government or donated material coordinated by central government, trucks procured by central government and aircrafts and vessels of Self Defense Force transported a large amount of materials at the Great East Japan Earthquake. In case of transportation from prefectural stockyard to municipal stockyard, truck association in each prefecture delivered almost all transportation. Transportation from municipal stockyard to evacuation center varies depending on municipalities and timing; case 1) transportation by official vehicle or their own vehicles, case 2) by vehicles of Self Defense Force and case 3) by private distributors commissioned by municipality.

36. Some relief material used was a purchased product from companies with auto transport by the transportation into the area.

**Thailand**

37. In Thailand the FROC used Don Muang International Airport as the hub to get donations as well as to store sorting and transport the relief goods. The delivery of relief goods to the disaster area was provided through vehicles arranged by government and the military.

38. When donated goods come at FROC it considers as to whom and where should the relief go first.

39. In sorting process, there are many volunteers and military help is also taken in sorting and packing items to facilitate the distribution but the system was not effective because of lack of main coordinator.
40. Since the affected area was huge there was lack of adequate transport system in place it was difficult to deliver the goods to the affected people as a result of which relief got piled up and could not be delivered in time.

4) **Collaboration with partners**

   **A. NGO/INGO/Volunteer**

   **Japan**

41. Japan has central agency to coordinate assistance to the NGO such as JANIC and Japanese Red Cross. The Chief Cabinet Secretary’s Office is responsible for coordinating volunteer groups and NGOs through its Volunteers Coordination Unit in order to facilitate the communication and exchange of information among the organizations working in Tohoku area to support the survivors and coordination of international NGOs and their local partners.

42. Stakeholder involvement - The national and local government, communities, NGOs, and the private sector all know their role.

   **Thailand**

43. Thailand has no central agency to coordinate the NGO assisting victims with the government like in Japan.

44. However, In the event of disaster, including Thailand flood 2011 found a lot of volunteers to the affected areas without effective management support systems, lack of funding and communication. Volunteers had no direction to do anything or extend any help. Many a times the volunteer may not be prepared for practice and lack of skills needed to help.

45. The Thai Red Cross in tsunami disaster in Thailand 2004 report concluded that cooperation of the volunteer is important to make donations delivered to disaster victims in a timely manner. It should be in the policy process to develop a network of volunteers that are available and build their capacity to work as volunteers to work. It is important to prepare volunteers in order to reduce losses and to assist the community and effectively in a time bound manner.
46. The DDPM recognizes the importance of the role of volunteers in disaster management and CBDRM projects to provide community-based disaster management. It is important to develop the capacity of the community. Preparedness training to the community has the potential to alleviate suffering and to cope with a disaster on their own.

47. Civil Defence Volunteer is a community-based organization whose function holistically is to assist the government official’s operation in all types of disaster. Currently, there are approximately 1.2 million Civil Defence Volunteers (2014) that had been trained and registered nation wind. These Civil Defence Volunteer are based in their community and are on stand-by to be summoned at all time. An important role in surveillance, reconnaissance and rescue victims in the area which can more effectively be performed by the volunteers.

B. Civil Society

Japan

48. During the GEJE the Social Welfare Council is also worked effectively. The Japan National Council of Social Welfare set up volunteer centers in the affected municipalities. The social welfare councils in municipalities nationwide sent more than 30,000 person-days of staff to operate the volunteer centers. The civil society organizations played an indispensible role in disaster management. These organizations have the advantage of flexibility and speed in reaching and caring for affected communities.

49. In case of disaster, civil society in Japan is quite strong. There are Social Welfare Councils in a nationwide set up with volunteer centers in the affected municipalities. It’s making the volunteer activities in community are effective and also continue has activity when in normal situation.

Thailand

50. Thailand doesn’t have a formal organization of civil society like Japan to deal with disasters but has temporary organizations which are set up temporarily to do activity at that the time of disaster. For example, Thai Flood Group. Thai Flood Group is a group of public organizations with the team as a volunteer to help FROC since its first opening. This group has no less important role in
providing information to the public. Flood situation in real-time and useful information on various aspects to cope with the floods through cyberspace, complaint issues the flood victims across the country and was made available through a platform www.thaiflood.com.

C. Private Sector

Japan

51. Partnership between international organizations and private companies: Some international organizations and private companies offered domestic transport for some of the foreign relief goods for free of charge. Other companies also provided a warehouse at Narita Airport and the management of the warehouse for free. Moreover, although with limited results, partnership with NGOs was also sought.

52. Relief supplies, which were then sent first to prefectural primary distribution centres, then on to secondary distribution centres at the municipal level, before being delivered to evacuation centres. Delivery as far as the secondary distribution centres was undertaken by the Japan Trucking Association, according to the terms of a pre-existing emergency agreement.

53. Yamato Transport, Japan’s largest delivery firm, was able to keep its business running and to rapidly restart delivery to the tsunami-affected area. In this time of need, some Yamato drivers, who themselves were affected by the disaster, restarted delivery in disaster-affected areas on their own initiative. Other Yamato workers soon followed, using their expertise to manage, sort, and distribute supplies at the distribution centres. Yamato HQ, in support of such ground-up efforts, set up a Relief Supplies Logistics Support Team. As the human element at the end of a chain of emergency supplies, Yamato provided logistics support to 350 evacuation centres in the three worst affected prefectures, in a manner that met the specific needs of evacuees.

54. Japan government has pre-existing emergency agreement with private sector so that it can help people and government a lot when in large disaster occurred and cooperation between private sector in Japan can be a model in another country.
**Thailand**

55. Private sector in Thailand had a little role in Thailand flood because they wasn’t any pre-existing emergency agreement between government and private sector like in Japan.

56. Private sector in Thailand also had a minor role in getting involved in disaster management a little. However, in this flood private agencies such as Thai SCG organized buses to shuttle people affected by flooding. CP Groups provided relief to the public. While the Seven Eleven provided food for public service as well.

5) **Problems (Sorting/Distribution/Stockpile/Vehicle/Trucking/Shipping)**

**JAPAN – 2011 GEJE**

57. A large number of excessive materials was received but there was no system to manage the information on relief supplies.

58. There was no preparation or plan for the management of donated goods in prefecture level and local government level.

59. There is no training to local and international staff for assessment in affected areas. As a result, the government response to disaster was poorly managed and coordinated, and many people suffered needlessly and difficulties in needs assessment of affected areas by central government and prefecture.

60. In the aftermath of the disaster, this kind of information about the emergency goods ordered by the national government was not available to prefectures and municipalities in time. In addition, relief goods often arrived unexpectedly from various private companies, nonprofit organizations, and individuals with no prior information.

61. There were issues like, difficulties in needs assessment of affected areas by central government and prefecture, ineffective material procurement system, shortage of stockpile and difficulties in making procurement request to prefecture from municipality.
62. The communication between the government and field responders was one direction only from the top down.

63. A large number of various donated materials with insufficient information, containing mixed items were received. Also changes in needs according to the lapse of time was there but it was not taken care of.

64. It took long time to distribute minimum food and drinking water and there was inequality of amount of material among affected municipalities and difficulties of assessment of evacuation center by municipality due to damaged government building, information shutdown and fuel shortage.

65. The Japanese government also administers the needs of those affected were not thorough. Mostly, victims often received aid who were in evacuation centers. For those living outside the camps did not get relief materials because they were not surveyed.

66. Donations of critical items such as food were turned away by the government at the very time when many survivors were desperately in need. On the other hand, unneeded donations poured into some areas, resulting in oversupplies of food and medicine in some locales while others faced severe shortages.

67. There was lack of transportation capacity in the affected areas. The delivery system of relief goods faced several problems including fuel shortages, interruption of telecommunication services, and supply and demand mismatches, resulting in stockpiling of the goods in depots and delayed delivery to the people in need.

68. Shelter management in the disaster-stricken areas was weak and inconsistent, and in some cases appeared to be nearly nonexistent. Many shelters were described as either being “self-managed” or having “no management.” Local residents did their best to manage local shelters in the absence of any government presence or any guidance on shelter management. The result was a very uneven level of management where some shelters very well run and others were not.
69. There was no formally stated rational or set of principles established for importing and tracking donated goods.

70. There were many players involved with accepting and distributing goods which caused potential confusion. During the last floods, quite a few organizations did not go through established channels when donating goods. Some went directly to provinces. Others worked with government agencies that they already had established relationships with. There were, in fact, large numbers of stakeholders that were potentially involved in receiving, transporting and receiving goods.

71. There was no database or system in place for receiving and tracking goods. There appears to be no common national database system for receiving and tracking goods donated. Even at the departmental level the way goods were tracked depends on the individual officer. There were many examples that can potentially be applied to this including just-in-time delivery systems and supply chain tracking systems used in the private sector. The military also had developed open source systems that could be used.

72. FROC had a major problem in the management of the heterogeneity. There was no system for public information. It was also found that most people donated charity. When being transported to distribute to public it was found that there were complaints from the public that there is no transparency in distribution. And bringing things out of the FROC had to go through security checks before.

73. Arrangements lacked experience with respect to shelters and evacuation centers. These centers were flooded at some locations and at many locations there was issue of congestion and these centers were far away from the residences too. Therefore, there were problems in the evacuation of some communities. Many people in the disaster area refused to abandon their homes for fear of being robbed.

74. Owing to no system of receiving the donation, the donations contained labels of acting and former politicians of the ruling party. Besides, donations were hoarded for specific groups of victims.
75. There are many problems in the storage, sorting and transport. There as a major problem in the management of non-union. There were complaints about discrimination of goods. Political interference was also there and before the goods could cross FROC, it needed political approval.

There were common problems of large number of excessive materials and lack of system to manage the information on relief supplies. During the 2011 GEJE it was noticed that there was no preparation or plan for the management of donated goods in prefecture level and local government level but such system existed at the Central Govt. (Cabinet Office) level. But in large disaster like the GEJE, the Cabinet Office cannot manage and handle such a huge volume of relief material at its own without arrangements at the Prefecture or Local level. The one direction communication only from the top down is not enough. Difficulties in needs assessment of affected areas by central government and prefecture were seen. Lack of information, shortage of transportation facilities and fuel hampered relief operations. There were oversupplies of food and medicine in some area while others faced severe shortages.

Thailand has no formally stated set of principles established but has Preparedness Plan at all level from national level to provincial level. But the plan was not put to operation when 2011flood occurred. Thai Government used FROC as the hub to manage everything, receiving the donation, storage, sorting and transport. There was a major problem in the management of non-union. There were many players involved with accepting and distributing goods which caused a lot of confusion. Besides, there was a lot of political interference in the relief distribution.
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